{"id":84872,"date":"2026-02-12T11:39:08","date_gmt":"2026-02-12T10:39:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lexxion.eu\/?post_type=dpi&p=84872"},"modified":"2026-02-12T11:39:08","modified_gmt":"2026-02-12T10:39:08","slug":"data-protection-insider-issue-148","status":"publish","type":"dpi","link":"https:\/\/www.lexxion.eu\/en\/dpi\/data-protection-insider-issue-148\/","title":{"rendered":"Data Protection Insider, Issue 148"},"content":{"rendered":"

-ECtHR Rules on Value Judgments in Reporting-<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n

On 3rd February, the ECtHR ruled in the case of Ramishvili v. Georgia<\/em>.<\/a> In terms of the facts, the case concerned a lawyer, involved in a high-profile case. In the course of a public television interview, another individual, Father I, made comments about the applicant, discussing his role in the case, and in another case, including to the effect that the applicant was an informer \u2013 for the security services \u2013 and provocateur. Following the interview, the applicant brought a civil defamation claim before the national courts on the basis that \u2018the\u2026statements had been defamatory, as they had contained substantially false information which had inflicted damage on his honour and professional reputation\u2019. Whilst successful in the first instance, the decision was subsequently overturned by an appellate court, whose decision was then upheld by the supreme court \u2013 in part on the basis that certain of the comments in question represented value judgments and were thus deserved of absolute protection. In this regard, the applicant complained to the ECtHR that \u2018the domestic courts\u2019 refusal to protect his professional reputation against the publicly voiced, unconfirmed accusation by a well-known clergyman that he was an informer and provocateur who fed information to Security Services amounted to a violation of his rights under Article 8\u2019. The Court found a violation, concluding \u2018that the domestic courts failed to strike a fair balance between the competing interests involved under the Convention\u2019. In this regard, the Court recalled the need for national authorities to balance the right to freedom of expression, and the right for private life, and pointed to the principles for balance in established case law. In this regard, the Court considered the following three factors: first, the \u2018subject of the disputed statements and their contribution to a debate of general interest\u2019 \u2013 in relation to which the Court recognised that the discussions related to a well-reported case and thus contributed to a debate of general interest; second, how \u2018well-known the applicant was\u2019 \u2013 in relation to which the Court accepted domestic authorities\u2019 consideration that a \u2018publicly known\u2019 lawyer could be classified as a public figure; and third, the content \u2018form and consequences of the statements\u2019 \u2013 in relation to which the Court considered the lack of factual corroboration for statements made, and the domestic courts\u2019 lack of appropriate consideration of the need to provide adequate factual basis even for certain value judgments. We would highlight, of particular interest in the case, the Court\u2019s discussion on the relationship between facts and value judgments, and the relationship between both of these and violations of freedom of expression.<\/p>\n

-ECtHR Rules on \u2018Integrity Testing\u2019 in Hungary-<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n

On 3rd February, the ECtHR ruled that the \u2018integrity testing\u2019 framework in Hungary breaches Article 8 ECHR in Szelenyi and Others v Hungary<\/em>. As to the facts of the case, in 2011 Hungary introduced a new law concerning the integrity screening of certain state employees, which also allowed secret surveillance measures. The applicants were amongst those subject to the screening. They complained that \u2018the fact that they could be subjected to secret surveillance measures in the course of integrity testing violated their right to respect for their private and family life\u2019. The Court first recalled that secret (video) surveillance at work constitutes an interference with Article 8 ECHR rights. Then, it moved on to examine the applicable legal framework and especially whether adequate safeguards against abuse existed. It noted that in Hungary, potentially every state employee could be indiscriminately subject to such testing \u2013 i.e. the law did not require a targeted application to those against whom suspicions, e.g. of corruption, existed. The Court also paid attention to the fact that the required justification for ordering integrity testing did not live up to a strict necessity test. Furthermore, on the topic of subsequent notification and remedies, the Court \u2018finds it relevant that the person concerned is only informed that an integrity testing procedure has been conducted against him or her and that it has been terminated, without he or her having access to any further details about the procedure itself. Nor does domestic law allow the person concerned to be informed as to whether any measure of secret information gathering was used during the integrity testing procedure. These gaps in the notification system make it inherently difficult for the person concerned to subsequently seek a remedy for the application of the measures in question. The national law thus eschewed an important safeguard against the unlawful or arbitrary use of integrity testing or special means of surveillance\u2019. On a related note, the Court observed that the applicants did not have an \u2018effective access to an independent and impartial body with jurisdiction to examine any complaint relating to unlawful integrity testing or secret intelligence gathering\u2026, independently of a notification that such measures had taken place\u2019. Thus, it concluded that the Hungarian system violated Article 8 ECHR on account of the fact that it fell short of the \u2018quality of the law\u2019 requirement and did not ensure that the surveillance measures are limited to what is \u2018necessary in a democratic society\u2019.<\/a><\/p>\n

-EDPB Releases New Documents-<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Last week, the EDPB released the following two documents:<\/p>\n