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Too Little, Too Slow? Climate Adaptation at the United Nations Climate Change Negotiations Since the Adoption of the Paris Agreement

Timo Leiter*

Adaptation to climate change has become a top priority of negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement. However, most of the literature on global climate governance focuses on mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. This article therefore proposes a framework for tracking negotiation outcomes on adaptation based on the four dimensions of the Adaptation Gap Report of the United Nations Environment Programme (planning, finance, implementation, and effectiveness) and on key governance functions outlined in the climate policy literature. By comparing the adaptation outcomes of the three most recent Conferences of the Parties (COP25 – COP27) with the baseline of adaptation provisions in the Paris Agreement and its rulebook, the extent and type of decisions on adaptation are assessed and the evolution of relevant agenda items is analysed. Decisions adopted since 2019 have concentrated on support and transparency while the Paris Agreement made greater use of signalling and rule-setting. The extent to which adaptation gaps identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change can be reduced through decisions at UN climate change negotiations is influenced by the potential and limits of governing a context-specific subject matter at the global level. Reflecting about how adaptation can be facilitated through multiple governance functions will be vital for the development of an effective framework for the global goal on adaptation.

I. Introduction

The Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emphasises the importance of adapting to current and expected climate change in parallel to strong and near-term emission reductions if the goals of the Paris Agreement are to be achieved.¹ Record-breaking extreme weather events in 2022 including unprecedented flooding in Pakistan and the longest and most extensive heat wave

in China underscore the urgency to act.² While global climate governance was initially concentrated on mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, adaptation to climate change has become an important subject of intergovernmental negotiations. Indeed, the Presidencies of the 26th and 27th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that took place in November 2021 in Glasgow, United Kingdom and in November 2022 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt named

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- 1 IPCC, *Climate Change 2022. Mitigation of Climate Change. Working Group III contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (2022, Cambridge University).
- 2 WMO, *WMO Provisional State of the Global Climate 2022* (2022, World Meteorological Organisation).

adaptation as one of their top priorities.³ Yet, literature on the UN climate change negotiations has so far paid only scant attention to adaptation. Very few empirical studies of the actual negotiations exist and even fewer for the period after the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015. This gap is surprising given that adaptation achieved a higher profile through the Paris Agreement and given that the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC finds that significant adaptation gaps persist.⁴ Literature available to date cannot comprehensively answer whether the UN climate change negotiations contributed to addressing these adaptation gaps during the implementation phase of the Paris Agreement. It is therefore pertinent to analyse what has been negotiated on adaptation, what decisions were taken and what can and cannot be expected from international law on adaptation.

Answering whether progress on adaptation has been made is not straightforward. Unlike mitigation of GHG emissions, climate adaptation does not have a universal metric⁵ and its ambition or implementation level cannot simply be aggregated based on countries' national pledges.⁶ This article therefore proposes a framework to track and assess negotiation outcomes on adaptation along the four dimensions of the Adaptation Gap Report of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)⁷ and along key governance functions used in the climate policy literature. Based on this framework, negotiation outcomes on adaptation are reviewed and findings discussed in relation to expectations from negotiation groups and literature on global adaptation governance. The arti-

cle concludes by identifying future research needs and with an outlook towards COP28 that will take place in Dubai, United Arab Emirates in December 2023.

This research is informed by participant observation at the three most recent UN climate change conferences (COP25-COP27 in November/December 2019, 2021 and 2022, respectively) and the intersessional negotiations in June 2019 and June 2022.⁸ Literature on global environmental politics increasingly recognises that understanding negotiation outcomes requires observing the negotiation process first-hand rather than interpreting final decision texts in the absence of knowing how they evolved.⁹ The author also participated in workshops mandated by COP26¹⁰ under the work programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)¹¹ and in related events of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)¹². Findings of the article are highly relevant for upcoming negotiation sessions and workshops towards COP28, especially regarding the work programme on the GGA.

II. Global Adaptation Governance and Adaptation in UN Climate Change Negotiations

Literature on the governance of climate adaptation has predominantly concentrated on the local, urban and sub-national level, with fewer studies on national adaptation governance.¹³ Global adaptation governance has received rather limited attention. Persson (2019)

3 The UK COP Presidency Glasgow Imperative: Closing the Adaptation Gap and Responding to Climate Impacts <<https://uk-cop26.org/the-uk-cop26-presidency-glasgow-imperative-closing-the-adaptation-gap-and-responding-to-climate-impacts/>> accessed 10 December 2022; I Gerretsen, 'Egypt to host next climate summit, putting a spotlight on resilience' (Climate Change News, 12 November 2021) <<https://www.climatechangenews.com/2021/11/12/egypt-host-next-climate-summit-putting-spotlight-resilience>> accessed 1 December 2022.

4 IPCC, *Climate Change 2022. Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Working Group II contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (2022, Cambridge University).

5 IPCC (n 4): Chapter 17.5.2, 'Adaptation monitoring, evaluation & learning' 17-91 – 17-101.

6 Ambition on mitigation is measured based on countries' proposed emission reductions and the corresponding expected future temperature. See: UNFCCC, 'Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. Synthesis report by the secretariat' (2022) Document FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/4.

7 UNEP, 'Adaptation Gap Report' 2022.

8 Due to the COVID pandemic, COP26 was postponed by a year to November 2021. The intersessional negotiations in June 2020 were cancelled and those in June 2021 took place in a limited virtual format.

9 See for instance R Dimitrov, 'The politics of persuasion: UN climate change negotiations' in P Dauvergne (Ed.). *Handbook of Global Environmental Politics* (2012, Edward Elgar); H Hughes et al, 'Global environmental agreement-making: Upping the methodological and ethical stakes of studying negotiations' (2021) *Earth System Governance*, 21, 100121.

10 Decision 7/CMA.3, paragraph 12.

11 Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation <<https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/glasgow-sharm-el-sheikh-WP-GGA#eq-5>> accessed 10 December 2022.

12 For instance, the Climate Change Expert Group Global Forum on 13-14 September 2022, sessions on 'Adaptation in the Global Stocktake'. <<https://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/ccxg/globalforumontheenvironmentandclimatechange-september2022.htm>> accessed 9 December 2022.

13 IPCC (n 4).

conceptualises it along three dimensions: the scale of the adaptation problem, the level of governance, and the level actors operate at, and depicts each dimension on a continuum from local to global.¹⁴ The present article focuses on the primary source of global adaptation governance and law, the UN climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Specifically, it concentrates on the actual negotiations by Parties to these treaties, i.e., the decisions taken by states as actors at the COP and its subsidiary bodies. These decisions are referred to here as ‘negotiation outcomes’.¹⁵ Other initiatives or events that take place on the side-lines of UN climate change conferences but that are not negotiated are not considered.¹⁶

Most of the literature on global climate governance and climate law has been dealing with ways to reduce the causes of climate change rather than how to govern responses to the already experienced and projected climate impacts. A systematic review found that ‘the lack of research explicitly studying the adaptation provisions within the Paris Agreement is a gap’.¹⁷ Among the small body of literature examining adaptation in the UN climate change negotiations, the majority of articles are limited in scope to matters of adap-

tation finance.¹⁸ While several articles have reviewed the history of adaptation in the UN climate change negotiations¹⁹, only one in-depth account of how adaptation negotiations evolved in the first three years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement has been published.²⁰ No systematic analysis of the adaptation negotiations since COP24 in December 2018 is available to date, leaving a crucial gap in our understanding of how this subject has advanced in international law.

Hall & Persson (2018) examined the legalisation of adaptation under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and find that adaptation provisions are characterized by low obligation and low precision.²¹ Persson (2019) suggests this status is caused by a) a contested rationale for global-level governance on adaptation, and b) the ambiguity of definitions of adaptation, especially in regard to sustainable development and the associated challenges of assessing adaptation progress.²² As a result, adaptation provisions are more procedural rather than substantive, are mainly voluntary and leave considerable discretion to countries. The ‘soft law’ characteristic of the Paris Agreement is therefore even more pronounced for adaptation than for mitigation.²³ The first-hand account of the coordinator on adaptation for the negotiation group ‘G77 and China’ over the period 2016-2018 confirms that most agenda items were of a procedural nature.²⁴

Considering this state of the literature, this article makes three original contributions. First, it proposes how negotiation outcomes on adaptation can be systematically tracked based on a framework derived from UNEP’s Adaptation Gap Report and governance functions discussed in the climate policy literature. Second, it provides the first empirical account how negotiations on adaptation evolved since the adoption of the Paris rulebook in 2018. Third, based on the findings and the reviewed literature, it discusses to what extent adaptation gaps can be addressed at the global level and whether expectations put on the adaptation negotiations have been met.

III. Assessing Negotiation Outcomes on Adaptation

1. Importance of Adaptation and Persistence of Adaptation Gaps

Adaptation seeks to reduce climate risks by limiting exposure and reducing vulnerability to climate haz-

14 Å Persson, ‘Global adaptation governance: An emerging but contested domain’ (2019) 10 *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change* 6, e618.

15 While this term is commonly used on the literature on UN negotiations, its equivalent under the OECD results terminology would be an ‘output’ whereas an ‘outcome’ would be the implementation or enactment of decisions taken at the negotiations. See OECD, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management* (2022).

16 The UK COP Presidency compiled a list of relevant adaptation initiatives that happened outside of the negotiations at COP26 in November 2021, see (n 3).

17 K Raiser et al, ‘Is the Paris Agreement effective? A systematic map of the evidence’ (2020) *Environmental Research Letters* 15, 083006.

18 See articles listed in Persson (n 14) 5.

19 See for instance L Schipper, ‘Conceptual History of Adaptation in the UNFCCC Process’ (2016) 15 *Review of European Community and International Environmental Law* 1, 82-92; M R Kahn and J T Roberts, ‘Adaptation and international climate policy’ (2013) 4 *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change* 3, 171-189.

20 M P Bueno Rubial, ‘The implementation phase of the Paris Agreement: The Adaptation Provisions’ In M P Bueno Rubial and L Siegele (eds.) *Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation* (2020, Springer Climate) 110-128.

21 N Hall and Å Persson, ‘Global climate adaptation governance: Why is it not legally binding?’ (2018) 24 *European Journal of International Relations* 3, 540-566.

22 Persson (n 14).

23 R Bodle et al, ‘The Paris Agreement: Analysis, Assessment and Outlook’ (2016) 10 *Carbon & Climate Law Review* 1, 5-22.

24 M P Bueno Rubial (n 20).

ards that result from, or are exacerbated by, human-induced climate change.²⁵ Adaptation can cushion the adverse effects of climate impacts but is constrained by various barriers and physical limits.²⁶ Adaptation becomes harder and costlier the higher global temperature rises.²⁷ While a high proportion of countries have adopted national adaptation plans and policies²⁸, the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC identifies significant adaptation gaps, asserting: ‘Despite progress, adaptation gaps exist between current levels of adaptation and levels needed to respond to impacts and reduce climate risks (high confidence). Most observed adaptation is fragmented, small in scale, incremental, sector-specific, designed to respond to current impacts or near-term risks, and focused more on planning rather than implementation (high confidence). (...). At current rates of adaptation planning and implementation the adaptation gap will continue to grow (high confidence).’²⁹

A recent report of the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction similarly concludes that ‘Despite progress, risk creation is outstripping risk reduction.’³⁰ Developing countries are therefore demanding more support and faster progress on adaptation, a call supported by the UN Secretary-General.³¹

2. A Framework for Assessing Negotiation Outcomes on Adaptation

Global progress on mitigation can be measured in physical quantities (GHG emissions and concentra-

tions in the atmosphere) and associated temperature projections. Global aggregation requires universal applicability of the underlying metrics irrespective of context and a uniform effect of mitigation outcomes, i.e., that benefits are equally distributed globally irrespective of where mitigation takes place. The latter applies since GHG emissions mix evenly in the atmosphere. For adaptation, however, these two conditions are not met.³² First, adaptation outcomes are very diverse. Fewer economic damages, lower death tolls from extreme events, sustained livelihoods despite changing climatic conditions and effective protection from sea-level rise are just four examples. No single metric can express these diverse outcomes across practically all sectors and contexts.³³ Second, climate hazards affect people differently due to different levels of vulnerability, i.e., the poorest and most disadvantaged are typically hit the hardest.³⁴ Assessments of adaptation success therefore need to consider who benefits and whether an adaptation intervention may leave others worse off by shifting rather than reducing vulnerability.³⁵ Furthermore, despite the presence of transboundary climate risks³⁶, adaptation benefits are usually more geographically concentrated and do not equate to equally shared global benefits as in the case of avoided GHG emissions. Accordingly, progress on adaptation, including negotiation outcomes, cannot be measured in the same way as mitigation.³⁷

The Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement includes adaptation and requires a review of progress made in achieving the GGA.³⁸ The Adaptation Committee reviewed potential methodologies and associated challenges of their operationalisa-

25 IPCC (n 4)

26 IPCC (n 4), Chapter 16.4.

27 This relationship is captured in Article 7.4 of the Paris Agreement.

28 M Nachmany and R Byrnes and S Surminski, ‘National laws and policies on climate change adaptation: a global review’ (2019) Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.

29 IPCC (n 4), Summary for policy makers, SPM-11.

30 UNDRR, ‘Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction’ (2022).

31 Secretary-General's message on the Launch of the United Nations Environment Programme Adaptation Gap Report, 3 November 2022. <<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2022-11-03/secretary-generals-message-the-launch-of-the-united-nations-environment-programme-adaptation-gap-report>> accessed 10 December 2022.

32 T Leiter and P Pringle, ‘Pitfalls and potential of measuring adaptation through adaptation metrics’ in L Christiansen, G Martinez and P Naswa (Eds.) *Adaptation metrics: Perspectives on measuring, aggregating and comparing adaptation results* (29–48) (2018 UNEP DTU Partnership).

33 IPCC (n 5).

34 K Thomas et al, ‘Explaining differential vulnerability to climate change: A social science review’ (2018)10 *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change* 2, 1-18.

35 A Atteridge and E Remling, ‘Is adaptation reducing vulnerability or redistributing it?’ (2018) 9 *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change* 1, 1-16.

36 T R Carter et al, ‘A conceptual framework for cross-border impacts of climate change’ (2021) *Global Environmental Change*, 69, 102307.

37 UNEP, ‘The Adaptation Gap Report. Towards Global Assessment’ (2017).

38 Article 7.14d.

tion.³⁹ The Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC confirms there is ‘no single ‘best’ approach or data source to assess global progress on adaptation (high confidence)’ and concludes that a comprehensive picture requires a combination of multiple methods and data sources.⁴⁰ No decision has yet been taken on an approach to assess adaptation progress under the Global Stocktake. Tasked with a similar demand for policy-relevant information, UNEP’s Adaptation Gap Report has assessed global adaptation progress under a systematic structure since 2020.⁴¹ Instead of attempting to define a list of global indicators, it has defined key dimensions of the adaptation process and presents globally available information on each dimension. This structure is aligned with the policy cycle and is sufficiently flexible to integrate new data sources annually as they become available.⁴²

While the evolution of the concept of adaptation and its role in the UN climate change negotiations have been reviewed by several scholars⁴³, no attempt at systematically assessing whether UNFCCC negotiations have advanced the prospects for adaptation since the adoption of the Paris rulebook has yet been undertaken in the scientific literature. This gap is striking given the high priority placed on adaptation in the Paris Agreement⁴⁴ and subsequent negotiation rounds. No framework for this purpose has yet been proposed.⁴⁵ A coherent structure is required against which negotiation outcomes can be tracked over time. It is proposed that the four dimensions employed by the Adaptation Gap Report (planning, finance, implementation, and effectiveness) provide a suitable structure for this task since they capture dis-

tinct stages of the policy cycle, are applicable to any national circumstances (e.g., different levels of economic development, different political systems and geophysical contexts) and have proven their feasibility in three editions of the Adaptation Gap Report. The report has also been frequently referred to during the negotiations in 2022⁴⁶ and is mentioned in the cover decision of COP27.⁴⁷

The Adaptation Gap Report seeks to assess adaptation progress globally including implementation by governments, international organisations and other actors. However, the COP to the UNFCCC and the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement do not have authority over national implementation and non-state actors. Kinley et al. (2021) observe: ‘In an international system based on the sovereignty of nation states, multilateral processes can ‘deliver’ commitments but not their implementation.’⁴⁸ It therefore needs to be considered what these global multilateral processes ‘can be reasonably expected to deliver’⁴⁹. Literature on climate governance has used the concept of ‘governance functions’ to specify *how* governance can steer behaviour and exert authority. Different variations of these functions have been used to assess the mitigation potential of global climate governance⁵⁰, to review the outcomes of COP27⁵¹, and to take stock of 30 years of international climate change negotiations.⁵²

To generate a suitable framework, the four dimensions of the Adaptation Gap Report and the governance functions proposed by Oberthür et al. (2021) and Kinley et al. (2021) were tested against the adaptation provisions in the Paris Agreement and its rulebook (see Table 2 - Appendix). It turned out that trans-

39 Adaptation Committee, ‘Approaches to reviewing the overall progress made in achieving the global goal on adaptation’ (2021) Technical paper by the Adaptation Committee.

40 IPCC (n 4), see Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS: Approaches and Challenges to Assess Adaptation Progress at the Global Level, 17-96 – 17-99.

41 A new structure for the report was introduced in 2020. Earlier editions conceptualised the adaptation gap (Adaptation Gap Report 2014), estimated adaptation finance needs (2016), explored global assessments of progress (2017), and provided a sectoral focus on health (2018). All reports are accessible here: <<https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report>> accessed 10 December 2022.

42 See for instance the evolution of the implementation chapter as described in the Annex of the 2022 Adaptation Gap Report (n 7).

43 Most recently by B Orlove, ‘The concept of adaptation’ (2022) Annual Review of Environment and Resources 47, 535–581.

44 A Lesnikowski, J Ford, R Biesbroek and S Austin, ‘What does the Paris Agreement mean for adaptation?’ (2017) 17 Climate Policy 7, 825–831.

45 Berrang-Ford et al, propose a framework for countries to track their national adaptation progress over time. See L Berrang-Ford et al, ‘Tracking global climate change adaptation among governments’ (2019) 9 Nature Climate Change 6, 440–449.

46 Own observation, especially during the negotiation sessions of the work programme on the GGA.

47 Decision 1/CP.27, paragraph 3.

48 R Kinley et al, ‘Beyond good intentions, to urgent action: Former UNFCCC leaders take stock of thirty years of international climate change negotiations’ (2021) 21 Climate Policy 5, 593–630, 594.

49 Ibid.

50 S Oberthür, L Hermwille and T Rayner, ‘A sectoral perspective on global climate governance: Analytical foundation’ (2021) Earth System Governance 8, 100104.

51 W Obergassel et al, this issue.

52 Kinley et al (n 48).

parency, one of the main governance mechanisms of the Paris Agreement⁵³, requires its own dimension. This decision is supported by research on the link between transparency and accountability which finds that the former does not necessarily enforce the latter.⁵⁴ Transparency can therefore not be equated with effectiveness.⁵⁵ Moreover, it became apparent that a cross-cutting dimension is required to account for provisions that apply to multiple dimensions.

In terms of governance functions, those proposed by Oberthür et al. (2021) provided a better fit than those suggested by Kinley et al. (2021).⁵⁶ The five governance functions adopted for the purpose of this article therefore are:

1. **Guidance and signalling:** Influencing actors' behaviour through common goals and objectives and signalling of desired courses of action.
2. **Rules and standards:** Agreeing to obligations, norms and standards of behaviour
3. **Transparency and accountability:** Agreeing on rules and procedures that facilitate transparency about actors' behaviour, especially the implementation of commitments, and that enable accountability
4. **Means of implementation:** Provision of financial, technological and capacity-building support
5. **Knowledge and learning:** Generation and sharing of relevant knowledge including scientific evidence, practical experiences and traditional knowledge, and promotion of learning

The resulting framework is described in Table 1 (Appendix).

3. The Paris Agreement and its Rulebook as a Baseline for Assessing Negotiation Outcomes on Adaptation

The UNFCCC of 1992 and its Kyoto Protocol from 1997 focused predominantly on mitigation. Adaptation is mentioned but not defined in the Convention. A key demand from developing countries for a new treaty has therefore been an explicit inclusion of adaptation and an equal treatment to mitigation.⁵⁷ The Paris Agreement includes adaptation among its long-term goals, contains a dedicated Article on adaptation and covers adaptation under the trans-

parency framework and the Global Stocktake.⁵⁸ Outstanding details of the Paris Agreement were negotiated in the following three years which culminated in the adoption of a rulebook at COP24 in December 2018.⁵⁹ Some scholars argue that its adoption marks a shift from regime-building to implementation.⁶⁰ Irrespective of this perspective, decisions adopted until the conclusion of the Paris Agreement's rulebook serve as an appropriate baseline for assessing negotiation progress on adaptation. Table 2 outlines this baseline along the framework introduced above.

IV. Adaptation Negotiations 2019 – 2022

1. Agenda Items on Adaptation

The UN climate change negotiations are organised along the agenda of the COP to the Convention, the agendas of its subsidiary bodies (the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice — SBSTA, and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation — SBI)⁶¹, and the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, abbreviated as CMA⁶². Table 3 (Appendix) shows the agenda items on adaptation during

53 Raiser et al (n 17).

54 A Gupta and H van Asselt, 'Transparency in multilateral climate politics: Furthering (or distracting from) accountability?' (2019) *Regulation & Governance* 13, 18-34.

55 In fact, a systematic review by Raiser et al (n 17) found that transparency is simultaneously viewed as an enabling factor and a barrier to success of the Paris Agreement.

56 Kinley et al (n 48) do not provide definitions of their proposed seven governance functions. Moreover, two of them, creating international law and increasing ambition, describe overarching functions that overlap with, or result from, other governance functions.

57 M P Bueno Rubial & L Siegle, 'Coordination of the G77 and China on Adaptation. Looking for the Appropriate Space for Adaptation under the UNFCCC' in M P Bueno Rubial & L Siegle (Eds.) *Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation* (2020, Springer Climate) 95-109.

58 Lesnikowski et al (n 44).

59 While details on the market mechanisms under Article 6 were only finalised at COP26 in Glasgow, all adaptation agenda items under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement were completed at COP24.

60 W Obergassel et al, 'From regime-building to implementation: Harnessing the UN climate conferences to drive climate action' (2022) 13 *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change* 6, e797.

61 UNFCCC Articles 9 and 10.

62 Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

the period 2019-2022.⁶³ It provides an overview of the content being discussed on adaptation as well as on the closure and opening of items. The following sections describe adaptation negotiations at COP25-27.

2. Adaptation Outcomes at COP25 in Madrid, 2-15 December 2019

COP25 was themed by the Chilean Presidency under the banner 'Time for action'. No consensus on an overarching agenda item on adaptation as requested by the African Group could be reached. In its place, a 'Ministerial Dialogue on Adaptation Ambition' was mandated and attended by numerous Ministers and the Prime Minister of Fiji. The only material decision with high adaptation relevance at COP27 was the adoption of revised guidelines for national communications by Annex I Parties. The guidelines contain a new structure for adaptation information including monitoring and evaluation. The adoption was significant since it replaced the far outdated guidelines from 1999 and contributes to enhanced transparency on adaptation by developed countries. No agreement could be reached on the report of the Adaptation Committee and on the composition of the Board of the Adaptation Fund. Overall, little material progress on adaptation was made at COP25.

3. Adaptation Outcomes at COP26 in Glasgow, 31 October – 12 November 2021

The UK Presidency had early on proclaimed adaptation at the top of the priority list of COP26.⁶⁴ Indeed,

63 Only the main adaptation items are considered. Other items have partial relevance for adaptation, e.g., the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture, or can otherwise affect adaptation, especially the finance items.

64 COP26 Presidency (n 3)

65 It is sometimes falsely reported that the work programme would develop a new global adaptation goal seemingly replacing the existing one contained in Article 7.1. The decision does not contain such a mandate.

66 For an overview of countries' M&E systems see T Leiter, 'Do governments track the implementation of national climate change adaptation plans? An evidence-based global stocktake of monitoring and evaluation systems' (2021) *Environmental Science & Policy* 125, 179-188.

67 Likewise, a dedicated agenda item on achieving 1.5°C was not taken up.

the CMA agenda featured for the first time a general agenda item on adaptation. A two-year work programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation was launched, fulfilling a major demand from the African Group and other developing countries. Its eight objectives include enhancing a common understanding of the existing goal⁶⁵, contributing to reviewing overall adaptation progress, enhancing national planning and implementation, and facilitating national adaptation monitoring and evaluation systems⁶⁶. COP26 also made significant progress on adaptation finance by deciding that a 5% levy on market mechanism activities under Article 6.4 will go to the Adaptation Fund, more than twice the previous 2% on Clean Development Mechanism activities under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. In the final hours of the conference, a doubling of overall adaptation finance by developed countries from 2019 levels by 2025 was also 'urged'. Additionally, the agenda item on the registry of Adaptation Communications could be settled for good. Overall, COP26 substantially advanced adaptation negotiations.

4. Adaptation Outcomes at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, 6-20 November 2022

The general adaptation item on the CMA agenda that had been introduced at COP26 was maintained but a newly proposed item on doubling of adaptation finance was not met with consensus.⁶⁷ The most notable negotiation stream was about the work programme on the GGA. Debate centred on whether a framework or any other arrangement should be established under the GGA, and if so, what it might entail. Negotiation sessions were tense and multiple competing proposals could not be reconciled. The African Group proposed a list of five new global targets and the development of associated indicators, but most negotiation groups agreed that it was premature to adopt text with potentially far-reaching consequences without time for thorough deliberation. Eventually, a compromise was reached to initiate the development of a framework for the existing GGA through a structured approach including four workshops in 2023.

A new agenda item that was opened in June 2022 debated the voluntary review of information on adaptation communicated in biennial transparency reports. Parties must submit these reports at the latest

by the end of 2024⁶⁸ but inclusion of information on adaptation is voluntary and was initially not foreseen to be reviewed. The main debates under this item related to the scope, objectives, and modalities of any review and to a possible training course for reviewers and its timeline. While this item was left unresolved at the intersessional meeting in June 2022, an agreement was reached rather quickly at COP27 (see Table 4 for details - Appendix). In the negotiations on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and LDC matters, the key demand from developing countries was more support for the implementation of NAPs beyond support for their formulation. As in previous years, the matter was deferred to the finance negotiations. The review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee remained undecided. However, a significant procedural agreement was reached through the adoption of rules of procedure for the LDC Expert Group which did not have any terms of reference during the first 20 years of its existence. Overall, while COP27 had been dubbed as an 'Adaptation COP', the topic was overshadowed by the strong attention on Loss & Damage⁶⁹ and significant work remains for negotiations in 2023 including at COP28.

5. Negotiation Outcomes on Adaptation 2019-2022

The main negotiation outcomes on adaptation achieved in the first three years after the adoption of the Paris rulebook are summarised in Table 4. Outcomes are concentrated in the finance, transparency and cross-cutting dimensions. Correspondingly, the primary governance functions were provision of support and enhancement of transparency. No outcomes solely attributable to the dimensions of planning, implementation or effectiveness were adopted.

V. Too Little, Too Slow? An Assessment of Negotiation Outcomes on Adaptation Since 2019

1. Achievements, Expectations, and the Role of International Law

A comparison between the baseline of adaptation provisions in the Paris Agreement together with its

rulebook as of December 2018 (Table 2) and decisions taken until end of 2022 (Table 4) shows that additional negotiation outcomes were achieved on adaptation finance and transparency, but not specifically on planning, implementation and effectiveness.⁷⁰ However, the comparison is only based on legal decision text and does not consider the activities, reports and capacity building conducted by bodies under the UNFCCC, especially the Adaptation Committee and the LDC Expert Group. For example, draft supplementary guidance for the development of Adaptation Communications was finalised before COP27⁷¹ but did not get mentioned by any decision. Additionally, numerous initiatives were announced outside of the negotiation space. For example, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation pledged to invest USD 1.4 billion to support adaptation of smallholder farmers by scaling up existing programmes and interventions.⁷²

Has sufficient progress been made at the UN climate change conferences in the three active negotiation years since 2019? The answer depends on the expectations different actors have. Out of the six negotiation demands on adaptation listed in the 'Plan for Solidarity, Fairness and Prosperity' endorsed by several Ministers and senior government officials from the Global South⁷³, two were fully met and two were partially met by November 2022. The Climate Vulnerable Forum, an alliance of developing countries, concluded that COP27's outcomes 'directly responded to most of the key asks as outlined by the vulnerable nations in our Accra-Kinshasa Commu-

68 For LDCs and SIDS, submission and timing is at their discretion (Decision 18/CMA.1, paragraph 4)

69 Obergassel et al (n 51)

70 The work programme on the GGA was classified as a 'cross-cutting' matter.

71 Adaptation Committee, 'Draft supplementary guidance for voluntary use by Parties in communicating information in accordance with the possible elements of an adaptation communication' (2022). FCCC/SB/2022/5/Add.1, 30 September 2022. FCCC/SB/2022/5/Add.1, 30 September 2022.

72 Gates Foundation Calls for Bold and Immediate Action at COP27, Announces New Commitment to Meet the Climate Adaptation Needs of Smallholder Farmers <<https://www.gatesfoundation.org/ideas/media-center/press-releases/2022/11/helping-african-and-asian-farmers-with-climate-change-adaptation>> accessed 12 December 2022.

73 Climate Action Network International. *COP26 Five-Point Plan for Solidarity, Fairness and Prosperity*, July 2021. <<https://climatenetwork.org/resource/cop26-five-point-plan-for-solidarity-fairness-and-prosperity/>> accessed September 2021.

nique' including its adaptation priorities.⁷⁴ However, many commentators agree that while COP27 had initially been dubbed as an 'Adaptation COP', its outcomes do not justify this label.⁷⁵ The most commonly mentioned unmet demand was more financial support for adaptation to most vulnerable countries.

Apart from additional adaptation finance, what else could have been agreed upon since 2019 that would have advanced adaptation? On planning, the Paris Agreement already contains a provision that 'Each Party shall, as appropriate, engage in adaptation planning processes' and refers to NAPs.⁷⁶ While it could have been decided to make NAPs mandatory or to prescribe certain characteristics of NAPs, this would have run counter to the provision that 'adaptation action should follow a country-driven (...) approach'.⁷⁷ Similarly, on matters of implementation, Hall & Persson (2018) observe that 'developing countries have traditionally argued for more country autonomy in how they use international adaptation financing'.⁷⁸ Indeed, there is a trade-off between specific global requirements on adaptation and national sovereignty which can hinder agreeing to further substantive rules. Moreover, many decisions on implementation and effectiveness require actions at other governance levels. For instance, only one of the four demands of the 'global climate adaptation overhaul'

that the UN Secretary General called for ahead of COP27⁷⁹ is under the immediate authority of the UNFCCC (adaptation finance) while creating more investable projects, better climate risk data and universal coverage of early warning systems can be called for, but not solely affected by the COP.⁸⁰ Likewise, half of the global priorities for adaptation proposed by Tye et al. (2022) actually fall under national and local jurisdictions.⁸¹ The question raised by former leaders of the UNFCCC secretariat is therefore especially relevant for adaptation: what can reasonably be expected to be regulated under international law?⁸²

The analysis of legalisation of adaptation under UNFCCC by Hall & Persson (2018) concluded that due to the vital role of national and local contexts for adaptation we are 'unlikely to see high obligation and precision' at the global level.⁸³ The concept of governance functions is helpful to articulate more precisely *how* international law can facilitate change including through soft rules such as signalling which can assert considerable influence even in the absence of formal obligations. While the Paris Agreement and its rulebook made extensive use of both signalling and rule-setting, decisions taken since then fall predominantly under the governance functions of provision of support and enhancing transparency (see Table 4).

Many of the adaptation negotiation sessions since 2019 have largely been about procedural matters and technical details that are necessary for the multilateral process to work. At times it seems that a mismatch exists between what the negotiations are expected to deliver on adaptation and what they actually address (Table 3). Even COPs that make substantial progress on adaptation such as COP26 cannot 'close the adaptation gap' as was implied by the subtitle of the 'Glasgow imperative' of the COP26 Presidency.⁸⁴ While international law and the momentum created by UN climate change conferences are vital for advancing adaptation, the adaptation gaps identified by the recent IPCC report require actions and commitment from a broad range of actors at all levels, especially by national governments.

2. Work Programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation and Outlook to COP28

The Paris Agreement established 'the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate

74 Climate Vulnerable Forum. *COP27 Delivers Landmark Outcome on Loss & Damage*. <<https://thecvf.org/our-voice/statements/chair/cop27-delivers-landmark-outcome-on-loss-damage/>> accessed 16 December 2022.

75 E.g., Stockholm Environment Institute (2022). *COP27 delivers on finance for Loss and Damage, disappoints on fossil fuels, adaptation*. <<https://www.sei.org/about-sei/press-room/cop27-delivers-on-finance-for-loss-and-damage/>> accessed 16 December 2022; Adaptation is also not mentioned under the "Five Key Takeaways" from COP27 published by the UNFCCC secretariat <<https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/sharm-el-sheikh-climate-change-conference-november-2022/five-key-takeaways-from-cop27>> accessed 1 December 2022.

76 Article 7.9b.

77 Article 7.5.

78 Hall and Persson (n 21), 556.

79 (n 31).

80 In fact, the Cover decision of COP27 contains a section on Early Warning Systems with reference to the call of the UN Secretary General and invites development partners to provide support (Decision 1/CP.27, section VII)

81 What the World Really Needs to Adapt to Climate Change, 15 December 2022. <<https://www.wri.org/insights/climate-adaptation-priorities>> accessed 15 December 2022.

82 Kinley et al (n 48).

83 Hall and Persson (n 21), 547.

84 UK Presidency (n 3).

change, (...) in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2.⁸⁵ Its wording represents a compromise between different proposals⁸⁶ but also reflects the challenges inherent in expressing adaptation in a substantive way that is simultaneously applicable to all countries.⁸⁷ At COP26, a two-year work programme on the GGA was launched and COP27 decided to initiate the development of a framework for the GGA.⁸⁸ Some commentators expressed that not having already agreed to a framework at COP27 would constitute lack of progress. However, the content and quality of the framework critically determine its ability to affect positive change. After all, it is possible that 'the framework of the GGA will strongly influence what type of adaptation action will be prioritised'⁸⁹ and that it 'create[s] new winners and losers in the race to access finance'.⁹⁰ Both concerns reinforce the need for a carefully crafted and thoroughly debated framework. Adopting a half-backed framework at COP27 might have seemed like progress but could have jeopardized the ability of the framework to make a difference. In fact, while many seem to assume that a framework for the GGA will somewhat automatically advance adaptation, this is not a given. A systematic review of experiences from the Millennium Development Goals found that 'globally agreed goals do not easily trickle down from the global to the national level'.⁹¹ National conditions including administrative capacity and economic development were identified alongside adequate support as key influencing factors for the implementation of a global goal.

Some of the demands made on the framework for the GGA appear contradictory, e.g., providing precise guidance for domestic action and a list of standardized indicators for global aggregation while at the same time remaining completely non-prescriptive, fully flexible to countries' circumstances and priorities, and avoiding any additional burden for developing countries. The inherent trade-offs between specificity and non-prescription and between global relevance and national flexibility need to be discussed technically and politically. Akin to the quest of determining which countries are 'particularly vulnerable'⁹², these trade-offs cannot be 'solved' by academia.⁹³ A similar trade-off exists for simplicity and meaningfulness of any global indicators.⁹⁴ Evidence shows that simplistic indicators like 'Number of countries with a plan' or 'number of beneficiaries' that do not consider the *quality* of plans and inter-

ventions can provide a false sense of progress or be unreliable altogether.⁹⁵ Contrary to the approach of SDG-style indicators, the Adaptation Gap Report demonstrates how global progress on adaptation can be meaningfully assessed without a rigid indicator-based framework.⁹⁶

No proposal available at COP27 for a framework was advanced enough to garner support from all Parties. It will be important to structure the four workshops in 2023 under the work programme on the GGA in a way that provides for focused discussions on specific aspects of the framework as well as on how the framework ought to make a difference for adaptation. Without advancing and converging on these matters throughout the year, it will be difficult to get to a suitable framework that could be adopted at COP28.

3. Implications for Future Research

The framework proposed in Table 1 enables tracking of negotiation outcomes over time and is useful to

85 Article 7.1

86 Craft, B., & Fisher, S. (2015). *National experiences can inform a global goal for climate change adaptation*. IIED Briefing, April 2015

87 See section III.2 above.

88 Some commentaries falsely state that a framework had already been established, e.g., Alayza et al, 'COP27: Key Takeaways and What's Next' 8 December 2022 <<https://www.wri.org/insights/cop27-key-outcomes-un-climate-talks-sharm-el-sheikh>> accessed 9 September 2022.

89 E Beauchamp, C da Silva Bernardo and M P Bueno Rubial, 'Progressing the Global Goal on Adaptation — key issues' (2021) IIED Briefing.

90 P Pringle, A Thomas and E Strachanm, 'What next for the Global Goal on Adaptation?' (2021) Climate Analytics.

91 T Hickmann et al, 'Success factors of global goal-setting for sustainable development: Learning from the millennium development goals' (2022) Sustainable Development.

92 Article 4.4 of the UNFCCC requires developed countries to "assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation"

93 R J T Klein, 'Identifying countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change: an academic or political challenge?' (2009) 3 Carbon & Climate Law Review 3, 284–291.

94 T Leiter et al, 'Adaptation metrics: Current landscape and evolving practices' (2019) Background paper for the Global Commission on Adaptation. See <<https://gca.org/reports/adaptation-metrics-current-landscape-and-evolving-practices/>> accessed 9 September 2022.

95 UNEP (n 7), Chapter 2; Leiter (n 94); P W Pauw, C Grüning and C Menzel, 'Number of beneficiaries as an indicator for adaptation: do the numbers add up?' (2020) FS-UNEP Collaboration Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance.

96 UNEP (n 7).

structure the assessment of progress on adaptation under the UN climate change negotiations. The framework facilitates a descriptive assessment but requires additional analysis to evaluate whether the outcomes are sufficient and from whose perspective. Importantly, as the example of the framework for the GGA illustrates, negotiation progress is not simply a linear or binary matter and faster decisions do not necessarily equate to better progress. The significance and meaningfulness of particular negotiation outcomes need to be critically assessed against insights from available literature, country experiences and experiences from other UN treaties.

Future research needs to further explore the potential and limits of global adaptation governance and of international law on adaptation under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. The concept of governance functions is useful for qualifying the way negotiation outcomes can facilitate change, but imprecise definitions can reduce their analytical value. Furthermore, research about adaptation in the UN climate change conferences needs to pay closer attention to the actual content of the negotiations (Table 3) and be precise in the interpretation of decision texts. Further research on the underlying politics of adaptation at the global level could help explaining particular negotiation outcomes.

VI. Conclusion

This article presents the first account of the adaptation negotiations during the implementation phase of the Paris Agreement, i.e., since the adoption of its rulebook at COP24 in December 2018. Assessing progress on adaptation is more challenging than for mitigation since it cannot be counted in the same

way as greenhouse gas emission reductions. A novel framework is therefore proposed to track negotiation outcomes based on the dimensions of UNEP's Adaptation Gap Report and the concept of governance functions. A descriptive assessment of negotiation progress is presented based on comparing negotiation outcomes agreed until COP27 in November 2022 with the baseline from COP24 in 2018. During this period, negotiation outcomes on adaptation mainly concentrated on provision of support and enhancement of transparency whereas the Paris Agreement made greater use of signalling and rule-setting. While adaptation received a boost at COP26 in Glasgow, little progress was made at COP25 in Madrid and, despite high expectations, adaptation was overshadowed at COP27 by attention to Loss & Damage.

Many agenda items covering adaptation remain primarily procedural which contrasts to expectations that negotiations under UNFCCC could be the primary means of 'closing' adaptation gaps. While overall progress on adaptation globally has been 'too little, too slow'⁹⁷, the potential and limits of international law for governing a strongly context-specific subject matter need to be considered when assessing what could be reasonably regulated on adaptation globally. Importantly, the development of a framework for the global goal on adaptation does not automatically advance adaptation and it cannot substitute for decisions and commitments at other governance levels. Moreover, trade-offs between specificity of guidance and non-prescription, and between global relevance and diverse country contexts cannot be resolved apolitically by academia. The mandated workshops under the work programme on the global goal on adaptation need to be carefully orchestrated to debate *how* adaptation can be facilitated through governance functions and to advance on key aspects of a potential framework ahead of COP28. Ultimately, the adaptation gap cannot be closed as long as greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise.

⁹⁷ This phrase is part of the title of the 2022 Adaptation Gap Report by UNEP (n 7).

Table 1: Framework for tracking negotiation outcomes on adaptation.

Dimension	Description	Governance Functions (most applicable ones per dimension)
Planning	Decisions concerning any preparatory efforts and capacity building for planning, legislation, and access to adaptation finance	2.Rules and standards; 5.Knowledge and learning
Finance	Provision of support (finance, technology, capacity building)	4.Means of implementation
Implementation	Decisions concerning the implementation of any actions that seek to reduce climate risks, including reducing exposure and vulnerability to hazards, and building adaptive capacity and resilience	1.Guidance and sending signals; 2.Rules and standards
Effectiveness	Effectiveness of actions in reducing climate risks, building resilience or improving adaptive capacity	1.Guidance and signalling; 2.Rules and standards; 3. Transparency and accountability; 5.Knowledge and learning
Transparency	Rules, regulations and arrangements for the provision of information to steer the behaviour of actors and to promote accountability	3.Transparency and accountability
Cross-cutting	Aspects that are applicable to multiple of the above dimensions	Any, but especially 1.Guidance and signalling, and 5.Knowledge and learning

Table 2: Baseline for Tracking Negotiation Progress on Adaptation Based on the Paris Agreement and its Rulebook

Dimension	Provisions of the Paris Agreement and its rulebook	Legal qualifier	GF ¹
Planning	Adaptation planning processes including NAPs ²	shall, as appropriate	2
	Assessment of climate change impacts and vulnerability ³	shall, as appropriate	2, 5
	Assisting developing countries in identifying effective adaptation practices, adaptation needs, priorities, challenges and gaps ⁴	should	2, 5

Finance ⁵	International support shall be provided to developing country Parties ⁶	shall	4
	Collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year ⁷	shall	4
	Provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation ⁸	should	4, 1
Implementa- tion	Strengthening the global response including by (b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience ⁹	aims to	1
	Global Goal on Adaptation ¹⁰	establish	1
	Implementation of actions ¹¹	shall, as appropriate	2
	Integrating adaptation into policies and actions, where appropriate ¹²	should	1, 2
	Adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach , (...), and should be based on (...) the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional and indigenous knowledge ¹³	should	1, 2
	Strengthening institutional arrangements to support the synthesis of relevant information and knowledge, and the provision of technical support ¹⁴	should	5, 4
	Building the resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems ¹⁵	shall, as appropriate	1
Effective-ness	Improving the effectiveness and durability of adaptation actions ¹⁶	should	1
Transparency	Adaptation communications: submission and periodical update ¹⁷ , list of topics ('elements') Parties are invited to use ¹⁸ , development of supplementary guidance for voluntary use ¹⁹	should; invited to	3
	Enhanced transparency framework : Provide information related to climate change impacts and adaptation ²⁰ ; Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework including a list of topics ²¹	should, as appropriate	3
	Global Stocktake: Assess collective progress including on adaptation ²²	shall	3

Cross-cutting	Recognition of adaptation as a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions ²³	recognize	1
	Adaptation efforts of developing country Parties shall be recognized ²⁴	shall	2
	Greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts ²⁵	recognize	1
	Sharing information, good practices, experiences and lessons learned ²⁶	should	5
	Strengthening scientific knowledge on climate, including early warning systems ²⁷	should	5
	Monitoring and evaluation and learning ²⁸	shall, as appropriate	2,3,5

1 Governance Function

2 Article 7.9, especially 7.9b

3 Article 7.9c

4 Article 7.7d

5 Various additional Articles stipulate the provision of support for specific matters, e.g., for the implementation of transparency provisions (Article 13.14 and 13.15)

6 Article 7.13, Article 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3

7 Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 53

8 Article 9.4

9 Article 2.1b

10 Article 7.1

11 Article 7.9, especially 7.9a

12 Article 7.5

13 Article 7.5

14 Article 7.7b

15 Article 7.9e

16 Article 7.7e

17 Article 7.10

18 Decision 9/CMA.1, paragraph 7 and Annex

19 Decision 9/CMA.1, paragraph 15

20 Article 13.8

21 Decision 18/CMA.1, especially Annex chapters I and IV

22 Article 14.1

23 Article 7.2

24 Article 7.3

25 Article 7.4

26 Article 7.7a

27 Article 7.7c

28 Article 7.9d

Table 3: Adaptation Agenda Items 2019-2022

Body	2019 (incl. COP25)	2021 (incl. COP26)	2022 (incl. COP27)
COP			Matters related to adaptation (Report and review of the Adaptation Committee)
	Report of the Adaptation Committee		
	Matters of Least Developed Countries		
CMA		Matters related to adaptation (Report of the Adaptation Committee and 'work on the GGA')	Matters related to adaptation (Report and review of the Adaptation Committee; work programme on the GGA)
	Report of the Adaptation Committee		
	Public registry of Adaptation Communications		
	Adaptation Fund (under 'Matters related to finance')		
Joint SBI-SBSTA	Report of the Adaptation Committee		
			Work programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation
SBI	Reporting guidelines on National Communications for Annex I countries		
	National Adaptation Plans		
	Matters of Least Developed Countries		
	Adaptation Fund		
SBSTA			Voluntary review of adaptation information
	Nairobi Work Programme		

Table 4: Main Negotiation Outcomes on Adaptation 2019-2022 including COP25, COP26 and COP27.

Dimension	Negotiation outcomes on adaptation 2019-2022	Legal qualifier	GF ¹
Planning	No explicit outcome	/	/

Finance	Doubling of adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025 ²	urges	4
	Report on the doubling to be prepared by the Standing Committee on Finance by COP28	requests	4
	Market mechanisms contribute to adaptation funding: 5% of the issuance value of measures under Article 6.4 and an additional monetary contribution related to the scale of the activity go to the Adaptation Fund	shall	4
	Parties and stakeholders using cooperative approaches are strongly encouraged to commit to contribute resources for adaptation ³ , in particular through contributions to the Adaptation Fund	strongly encouraged	4
	Calls for a reform of multilateral development banks to increase their climate ambition ⁴	calls	1, 4
Implementation	No explicit outcome (see cross-cutting dimension for work on the GGA)	/	/
Effectiveness	No explicit outcome	/	/
Transparency	Information on adaptation submitted via Biennial Transparency Reports can be voluntarily reviewed as part of the technical expert review. The review will also consist of identifying areas of improvement and capacity-building needs related to reporting ⁵	may, on a voluntary basis; decides	3
	Development of a training course for experts undertaking the voluntary review ⁶	requests	3
	Revised guidelines for national communications of Annex I Parties including a structure for reporting adaptation information ⁷	adopts	3
	Public registry of Adaptation Communications ⁸ is approved	adopts	3
Cross-cutting	Work programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation established for a two-year period including four workshops each year ⁹	establish and launch	-
	Development of a framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation initiated ¹⁰	decides	1
	Urges Parties to adopt a transformational approach to adaptation ¹¹	urges	1
	Rules of procedure of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group adopted ¹²	adopts	3

1 Governance Function

2 Decision 1/CMA.3, paragraph 18

3 Decision 3/CMA.3 Annex, paragraph 67 and Decision 2/CMA.3, Annex paragraph 37

4 Decision 1/CP.27, Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan, paragraph 37 and 38.

5 Decision (Reviews on a voluntary basis of adaptation information)/CMA.4, paragraph 1 and 2.

6 Decision (Reviews on a voluntary basis of adaptation information)/CMA.4, paragraph 8.

7 Decision 6/CP.25.

8 Decision 21/CMA.3, paragraphs 2 and 3.

9 Decision 7/CMA.3, paragraphs 2 and 12.

10 Decision (Work programme on the GGA)/CMA.4, paragraph 8.

11 Decision 1/CP.27, paragraph 18 and 1/CMA.4, paragraph 34.

12 Decision (Matters relating to the LDCs)/CMA.4, paragraph 15 and Annex.