Litigation Brief #4/2025 Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, no. 20381/2025, Greenpeace ONLUS et al. v. ENI S.p.A. et al. Judgment of 21 July 2025

In this case, the Court:

  1. Decided that, in the case known as “La Giusta Causa” (Just Cause/Trial), jurisdiction over the claim filed by Greenpeace and others against ENI S.p.A. and its public shareholders lies with the Italian judiciary, rejecting the defendants’ separation of powers objections;
  2. Did not rule on the merits of the claim, as the proceedings concerned a regolamento di giurisdizione under the Italian Code of Civil Procedure aimed solely at establishing whether the Italian civil court had jurisdiction;
  3. Implicitly distinguished this case from the other landmark climate change case in Italy, “Giudizio Universale”, where jurisdiction had been denied because the claim was directed against the State in its legislative/administrative capacity for acts and measures reflecting political and policy functions;
  4. Further clarified that Italian judges retain jurisdiction over climate-altering emissions produced by ENI subsidiaries abroad, because the alleged harm occurred in Italy, where the plaintiffs reside;
  5. Confirmed civil jurisdiction over corporate climate claims, even when directed against corporations with public shareholders, but excluded the possibility of civil claims against the policies of the State or other public bodies.

 

Litigation Brief #4/2025 Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, no. 20381/2025, Greenpeace ONLUS et al. v. ENI S.p.A. et al. Judgment of 21 July 2025 - Picture1

(1) Jurisdiction over the claim

In the case known as “La Guista Causa”, or the “Just Cause”, the Supreme Court of Cassation clarified that jurisdiction over the claim brought by Greenpeace and others against ENI S.p.A. and its shareholders (the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and Cassa Depositi e Prestiti) lies with the Italian judiciary, specifically the Court of Rome. The Court dismissed the separation of powers objections raised by ENI and the other defendants, who had argued that the scrutiny requested from the civil judge would infringe on matters reserved to the legislative and political branches.[1]

The Court firmly rejected this reasoning, holding that the action was not an intrusion into political-legislative prerogatives but rather a civil liability claim against a corporation (ENI), even if ENI is partly owned and controlled by public entities. The judgment underscores the fundamental distinction between claims targeting public policy choices of the State and those directed against corporate actors whose conduct produces climate-related harm. The latter, the Court found, can be the object of a civil claim over which the civil court has jurisdiction.

(2) No ruling on the merits

The Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the Giusta Causa because its role was limited to determining questions of jurisdiction.  Under Article 41 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, the parties of an ongoing trial can request the Supreme Court of Cassation to rule on jurisdictional issues (regolamento di giurisdizione). At this stage, therefore, the Court limited itself to clarifying which judicial authority was competent to hear the dispute, without ruling on whether any wrongful conduct had in fact occurred or whether a causal link could be established between the activities of the corporate defendants and the climate-related harms alleged.

Accordingly, the judgment does not establish liability, nor does it assess the validity of the plaintiffs’ (or defendants’) arguments on climate mitigation obligations or damages. The actual merits of the plaintiffs’ claims will instead be examined at a later stage by the Civil Court of Rome, which will be tasked with assessing whether the elements of liability are present and, if so, determining appropriate damages.

Nevertheless, the decision carries procedural significance, as it confirms for the first time at the level of the Supreme Court that Italian civil courts are competent to hear claims alleging breaches of climate change mitigation duties and damages arising from climate-damaging activities.

(3) Substantial difference from Giudizio Universale

This ruling also clarifies the uncertainty left by the earlier case known as “Giudizio Universale”. In that legal action, initiated in 2021 against the Italian Government, the claimants sought to compel the State to adopt more ambitious climate policies. The Court of Rome (Judgment No. 3552 of 26 February 2024) had dismissed the claim, reasoning that it concerned the lawfulness of measures and omissions attributable to the exercise of public powers, and therefore it could not fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. By contrast, in this case the Supreme Court highlighted that the action was fundamentally compensatory and injunctive in nature, and was brought against a corporate entity, not against the State in its sovereign capacity. Crucially, the Ministry and Cassa Depositi e Prestiti were sued not as public authorities exercising sovereign powers, but in their capacity as shareholders of ENI, which allowed the Court to frame the dispute as one concerning private law liability rather than public law obligations.

This distinction is pivotal: while Italian civil courts cannot adjudicate claims that effectively amount to judicial review of political or legislative decisions, they can hear claims against corporations — even state-owned ones — for harm linked to climate change.

(4) Extraterritorial emissions and EU law

The defendants also argued that part of the alleged harm arose outside Italy, through emissions produced by ENI’s subsidiaries incorporated abroad. Therefore, according to ENI, Italian authorities lack jurisdiction (partially, at least).

The Court rejected this line of argument. First, the Court observes that the claim is not directed against entities incorporated abroad, but rather against the parent company ENI, as the controlling entity of the group. Accordingly, the claim is not brought against a foreign entity but against an Italian company, in respect of activities also partially conducted abroad.

Since the alleged harmful events occurred at least partially outside Italian territory but are attributed to an entity registered in Italy, EU Regulation No. 1215/2012, Articles. 4(1)[2] and 7(2)[3] apply. Under these provisions, the Supreme Court affirmed that plaintiffs may choose between (i) the court of the place where the harmful emissions originated and (ii) the place where harm was suffered, that is, where the plaintiffs reside. The former would lead to actions in several different foreign courts. However, under the latter, Italian courts are competent because the plaintiffs reside in Italy and allegedly suffered harm in Italy, regardless of whether the emissions were also partially produced abroad. Indeed, the alleged violation of the right to life and to respect for private and family life, invoked in support of the claim, is deemed to have occurred in the claimants’ place of residence where the impairment of life expectancy, of health conditions, and of the overall quality of existence is expected as a consequence of climate change. This finding confirms that transboundary environmental harm does not deprive domestic courts of jurisdiction, a principle that may have significant implications for future climate litigation involving multinational corporations.

(5) Significance and limits of the decision

The judgement of the Supreme Court represents a milestone in Italian climate litigation. It affirms that civil courts have jurisdiction over claims for damages against private companies (including state-owned enterprises) arising from climate change impacts. At the same time, the Supreme Court of Cassation has drawn a clear demarcation between two distinct categories of actions. On the one hand, civil jurisdiction encompasses claims for damages brought against private entities — as in the present proceedings against ENI, notwithstanding its peculiar status as a corporation whose controlling shareholders include the Ministry of Economy and Finance and Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. On the other hand, civil courts are precluded from adjudicating claims that directly seek to establish State liability in actions aimed at challenging governmental acts, measures, or omissions falling within the sphere of political discretion and the normative definition of climate and energy policy (i.e. cases modeled on Urgenda Foundation v State of the Netherlands). In the latter category, civil remedies are unavailable, since such claims would effectively invite the judiciary to encroach upon matters reserved to sovereign decision-making. In this case, the fact that public entities (the Ministry of Economy and Finance and Cassa Depositi e Prestiti) are sued alongside ENI should not be misinterpreted. The Supreme Court stressed that they were sued in their capacity as shareholders of ENI rather than in their capacity as public bodies.

Moreover, it is worth reiterating that the Supreme Court did not address the substantive issues raised by the plaintiffs. Those matters remain open and will fall within the competence of the Court of Rome, which will examine them in detail at a later stage of the proceedings. Under Article 367 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs now have six months to resume proceedings before the Court of Rome, where the trial will then move to the discovery and evidentiary phases.

Climate change litigation implications

The ruling of the Supreme Court of Cassation may serve as an important precedent for further initiatives analogous to La Giusta Causa: namely, civil liability actions seeking damages against private companies, even where such companies are partially State-owned.

In this respect, the judgment appears to be substantially consistent with principles already affirmed in other jurisdictions, such as the 2021 Shell decision in the Netherlands and the 2025 Lliuya v. RWE decision in Germany. The latter case, in particular, seems analogous to Giusta Causa. In that proceeding, the German court (the Hamm Higher Regional Court) held that the civil courts are competent to adjudicate individual claims for injunctive relief and damages against major emitters, and that there is no legal basis to exclude claims with political relevance from the scope of civil liability. It may therefore be stated that a standard is emerging across several European jurisdictions and that a consistent body of climate change litigation has developed, affirming the competence of civil courts to hear this type of action against private corporations.

It must, however, be noted that procedural aspects (such as jurisdiction and standing standing) should be clearly distinguished from substantive issues. It is, in any event, difficult to foresee the possible outcome of the proceedings after the plaintiffs resume the suspended proceedings before the Court of Rome and the discovery phase begins. A crucial and particularly complex element will be the establishment of the causal nexus between ENI’s conduct and the damage allegedly sustained by the claimants.

Eventually, from a comprehensive reading of both the Giudizio Universale  and the Giusta Causa judgments, it seems that the Italian courts implicitly acknowledge a third possible category of actions distinct both from civil claims against private or mixed public–private entities, which are admissible, and from actions seeking to directly challenge the State’s climate policy (modeled on cases such as Urgenda Foundation v State of the Netherlands), which are not admissible. A third category could be recognised as viable under the Italian legal system: namely, actions brought before the Italian administrative courts. Such proceedings would not aim to contest the State’s climate policy in its entirety or seek a private entity’s liability for damages, but rather would challenge the unlawfulness of specific administrative measures allegedly invalid as being inconsistent with Italian and European legislation and policy. To date, however, this course of strategic climate change litigation has not been undertaken in Italy.

[1] Under Legislative Decree no. 152/2006, art. 57-bis and Legislative Decree no. 300/1999, art. 35.

[2]  “Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State (..).”

[3] “[I]n matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur (…)”.