How will Subsidy Control law change if the UK secures access to the EU internal electricity market?

How will Subsidy Control law change if the UK secures access to the EU internal electricity market? - UK Subsidy Control Insider European electricity grid

On Friday 20 November 2026, Prime Minister Andy Burnham will meet António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels for the second EU–UK summit1, the latest step in resetting the post-Brexit relationship. The UK is seeking access to the EU’s internal electricity market (the „IEM“)2. Negotiations, authorised by the Council in March 2026, will continue beyond the summit. Participation is expressly conditional on the UK applying, at all times, State aid rules equivalent to the EU’s to any aid that specifically targets the electricity sector or has a particular material effect on the electricity market3

Table of Contents:

  1. What is the IEM? 
  2. What steps has the UK taken to join the IEM? 
  3. What models would comply with this commitment? 
  4. The EEA Model 
  5. The new Swiss Model 
  6. The UK’s current State aid practice in Northern Ireland 
  7. The paths open 
  8. Judgement calls 
  9. Conclusion 

 

What is the IEM?

The IEM is an integrated, cross-border market which couples day-ahead and intraday electricity trading, capacity allocation and system balancing across participating countries4. It is an important pillar of the EU’s energy security strategy because market coupling allows cross-border flows to respond to scarcity, making national systems more resilient together than apart5. 

The IEM relies on all participants following harmonised EU rules. For non-EU participants, the EU has consistently required State aid discipline as the price of sectoral market access, as it did for the EEA EFTA States and, most recently, Switzerland. 

What steps has the UK taken to join the IEM?

During the Keir Starmer administration, the UK signalled its wish to join the IEM and held exploratory discussions with the European Commission. Their joint outcome, ‘Outcome of the exploratory discussions on the possible participation of the United Kingdom in the European Union’s internal electricity market’6, was published on 22 December 2025. On 30 March 2026 the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations.  

The joint outcome paper states that the Commission and the UK ‘should work towards the participation of the United Kingdom in the European Union’s internal electricity market, by way of a European Union-United Kingdom Electricity Agreement’. 

Paragraph 10 sets the price. The Electricity Agreement ‘should guarantee that there are the same substantive and procedural State aid rules’ as the EU’s, applied ‘at all times’ to ‘any aid that specifically targets the electricity sector or has a particular material effect on the electricity market’, with dynamic alignment with Union law. State aid control must be carried out ‘by an independent authority’ with ‘the same powers as the European Commission’, including recovery of incompatible aid with interest, subject to a transition period and protection for aid already granted. Paragraph 13 adds a dispute settlement mechanism with an independent arbitration panel, in which ‘the Court of Justice of the European Union is the ultimate authority for all questions of Union law’. 

Negotiations have continued since March 2026 and are expected to run beyond the summit. 

What models would comply with this commitment?

The same ‘substantive and procedural State aid rules’ could in principle be achieved either by setting up an equivalent domestic regime or by participating within the EU regime. There are two precedents for non-EU States: the European Economic Area (EEA) model, covering Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein,7 and the new Swiss model.8 

The EEA Model

The three EEA EFTA States are bound by Articles 61 to 64 of the EEA Agreement, which mirror Articles 107 to 109 TFEU. The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) exercises powers and follows procedures equivalent to the Commission’s, and the EFTA Court performs the equivalent judicial role to the CJEU. Binding EU instruments, such as the General Block Exemption Regulation, are incorporated into the EEA Agreement by the EEA Joint Committee; ESA then adopts guidelines that mirror the Commission’s almost verbatim. Formally, the EFTA Court need only ‘pay due account’ to CJEU case law decided after the EEA Agreement was signed, but in practice it follows it closely. The EEA Agreement provides procedures to resolve divergence, culminating in the option for the Contracting Parties to agree to ask the CJEU for an interpretation. That option has never been used. The arrangement reflects the CJEU’s insistence, since Opinion 1/91, on the autonomy of the EU legal order. 

The new Swiss Model

Switzerland’s model was signed by the EU and Switzerland on 2 March 20269 but is not yet ratified: the Council of States has voted to require a majority of both voters and cantons in a referendum. It applies State aid rules only to electricity, air and land transport, not across the economy. Unlike the EEA, supervision is national: Switzerland must establish an independent surveillance authority, whose decisions will be reviewed by the Swiss courts. The Federal Council proposed a chamber within the Competition Commission; the Council of States has since voted for a body separate from it. Switzerland secured grandfathering of its main existing support measures for several years (rather like existing aid on accession) and protection for hydropower concessions, water royalties and public ownership. A dispute between the EU and Switzerland over a measure would go to arbitration. If it raises a question of EU law, the panel must refer it to the CJEU, whose answer binds the panel, but the CJEU does not decide the dispute itself. 

The UK’s current State aid practice in Northern Ireland

Participation within the EU State aid regime is the model the UK already uses under Article 10 of the Windsor Framework. Article 10 applies EU State aid law to measures affecting trade between Northern Ireland and the EU in goods and in wholesale electricity, which in practice means the island of Ireland’s Single Electricity Market (SEM). Northern Ireland’s electricity sector is therefore already subject to EU State aid control. Within scope, the European Commission may investigate measures and must assess those that are notified.10 Commission decisions can be challenged before the EU courts, while UK courts enforce the standstill obligation and may refer questions to the CJEU. Oversight at EU level means the UK needs no domestic enforcer for these measures, but control is ceded to the EU. That model is not on offer for Great Britain: paragraph 10 envisages a UK authority. 

The paths open

For Great Britain, paragraph 10 points firmly to the Swiss end of the spectrum: an independent domestic authority with the same powers as the European Commission, applying dynamically aligned EU rules. That means ex ante control and standstill, the power to investigate non-notified aid, binding decisions and recovery with interest. What remains open is who the authority is, whether Ministers can direct it, and how its decisions are reviewed. Two kinds of challenge need to be distinguished. Interested parties would challenge the authority’s decisions in the UK courts, applying EU rules. Disputes between the EU and the UK would go to the arbitration panel envisaged by paragraph 13, which would have to refer questions of EU law to the CJEU, as under Article 174 of the Withdrawal Agreement. The CJEU’s case law on the autonomy of the EU legal order (Opinion 1/91; Opinion 2/13) means the EU cannot accept binding interpretation of EU law by a non-EU body. Unless the agreement creates one, UK courts would have no power to refer questions to the CJEU outside the Windsor Framework. 

The role of regulator will be politically exposed. Whichever organisation takes on these functions will need standstill powers, the power to block aid or order recovery of unlawful aid, and the institutional heft to withstand intense political pressure from Westminster, Holyrood, Cardiff Bay and Stormont. At the same time, officials will need to be expert in managing political and legal risk, whilst also having a detailed understanding of how EU State aid law involving the electricity market has developed. 

The main candidates to take on this oversight role are the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and Ofgem (the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority), which, like other sector regulators, has concurrent competition powers with the CMA. In Northern Ireland, the Utility Regulator co-regulates the SEM. Both the CMA and Ofgem are independent, but their governance differs: in how far each must have regard to government strategy (the CMA’s strategic steer; Ofgem’s strategy and policy statement for energy), in Ministers’ powers to direct them, and in funding, with Ofgem funded by licence fees from the industry it regulates. 

If the CMA took on the role, it would need to reconfigure, combining its Subsidy Advice Unit’s non-binding reports under the Subsidy Control Act 2022 with a binding assessment and enforcement function akin to the European Commission’s. The CMA did not have a role in State aid enforcement when the UK was an EU Member State (the Commission had exclusive competence over compatibility), but has shown agility in taking on the responsibilities of the UK’s novel approach to subsidy control. This would be a significant shift in responsibility and will bring a high level of political scrutiny to an independent body. The scope of paragraph 10 favours the CMA: aid with ‘a particular material effect on the electricity market’ can include support outside the energy sector, such as relief for energy-intensive industry, which a cross-economy body is better placed to assess. 

An alternative would be for the unit to sit within the energy regulator, Ofgem, although given Ofgem’s current functions that would require a new division with a different skill set. Ofgem would bring sectoral expertise and familiarity with strong enforcement powers and competition regulation. Against that, it is already embedded in the schemes it would police: it makes the Capacity Market Rules and determines disputes in the Capacity Market and Contracts for Difference processes. That creates a self-review problem. 

Alternatively, the UK might choose to establish a standalone specialised energy subsidy regulator. This would have the advantage of avoiding compromising the CMA’s broader domestic mandate, but would further fragment the institutional landscape. 

Judgement calls

Judgement calls will be a major challenge for any regulator. What is less visible is how much State aid control depends on dialogue. In a standard notification there is considerable back and forth between the Member State and the Commission, not unlike remedies negotiations in a merger case, and most discussions end in an agreed outcome. The Commission can hold its ground because Member States agreed the rules, other Member States will back it, and the CJEU stands behind it; if anything, some Member States have criticised the loosening of the State aid frameworks in recent years.11 ESA’s authority likewise rests on an international treaty and the EEA’s homogeneity obligation, which insulate it from any one government. A national Swiss or UK authority would lack that external anchor, and may find it harder to take positions that differ from those of its government and key domestic stakeholders. 

The Three Regime Complexity and Jurisdictional Overlap 

Whoever the regulator, an equivalent regime would require the UK to operate three distinct, parallel subsidy frameworks: 

  • the domestic regime built around the Subsidy Control Act 2022; 
  • the EU State aid regime based on Article 10 of the Windsor Framework, covering goods and the SEM in Northern Ireland; and 
  • the new Electricity Agreement arrangements, covering electricity in Great Britain.12 

Public authorities will find this a complex matrix to navigate. A GB-wide electricity scheme with beneficiaries in Northern Ireland could require an assessment under the Subsidy Control Act 2022, an assessment under Article 10 of its effect on the SEM, policed by the Commission, and a full State aid assessment under the Electricity Agreement for its effect in Great Britain, policed by the new UK authority. Paragraph 5 of the December 2025 paper requires the agreement to be ‘appropriately articulated with the provisions of the Windsor Framework’; how that is done will largely determine the scale of the problem.13 

Treating energy separately is not new. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement already sets specific principles for energy and environmental subsidies, implemented in Schedule 2 to the Subsidy Control Act 2022, and these draw heavily on EU State aid thinking.14 The Electricity Agreement would go further, replacing principles with the EU rules themselves. 

For a litigator, this tripartite system offers several routes to challenge a subsidy: a review in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) under section 70 of the 2022 Act; where Article 10 applies, a complaint to the Commission and proceedings in the UK courts, with a possible reference to the CJEU; and, under the Electricity Agreement, a complaint to the new authority followed by a challenge to its decision in the UK courts. Private parties would have no direct route to the CJEU under the Electricity Agreement as envisaged. The routes are more numerous than effective, however: public authorities had won all four challenges decided under section 70 by October 2026. 

Conclusion

Much of the reset of the EU–UK relationship has focused on reducing red tape and complexity. IEM access would cut the other way for subsidies. Public authorities would need to spot measures that affect the electricity market and apply EU State aid rules to them, alongside the UK subsidy control regime, and even within State aid would face different procedures depending on whether a measure falls under the Windsor Framework. The detail will depend on the negotiations, but paragraph 10 already fixes the essentials. Whichever body is chosen, the UK will need deep EU State aid expertise in the new authority and in the courts. The UK would also be subject to three subsidy regimes, as well as its WTO subsidy obligations, increasing complexity for those administering and applying for subsidies and multiplying the routes for those opposed to projects. Three steps would help: housing the function in a ring-fenced, binding-decision unit of the CMA; giving public authorities a single front door across all three regimes; and negotiating a clear, workable threshold for ‘particular material effect’15.