Large Regional Investment Project for Output Diversification

Large Regional Investment Project for Output Diversification - industrial tyre manufacturing

Executive Summary:

  • State aid for large investment projects must be adjusted downwards. 
  • The necessity and proportionality of state aid for large regional investment projects are shown either by their negative net present value or by the higher net present value at an alternative location.  

 

 Table of Contents: 

  1. Introduction 
  2. Eligible costs 
  3. Form and amount of aid 
  4. Incentive effect 
  5. Compatibility assessment 

 

Introduction

Hungary notified a measure to support a large regional investment project by Hankook, the South Korean tyre manufacturer. The project concerned diversification of the output of an existing facility of Hankook in Fejer county, a region eligible for regional assistance at a rate of 30% under Article 107(3)(a) TFEU. The investment is expected to have a significant economic impact with the creation of 469 jobs and upgrading of local labour skills. The Commission approved it in decision SA.116666.1 

Hankook already makes tyres in that region for cars and light trucks. The project will establish production capacity for tyres for heavy trucks and busses. Apart from the fact that tyres for heavy trucks and busses are bigger in size, they also differ in their composition, structure and construction. They have different tread compounds and patterns and a stronger structure to withstand heavier loads. The new products are intended for both vehicle manufacturers [original equipment] and the replacement market for sale to vehicle owners. 

Eligible costs

The project qualifies as a “large investment project” [LIP] in the meaning of the regional aid guidelines [RAG]. That is, the investment expenditure exceeds EUR 50 million. 

The total eligible investment costs are EUR 538.4 million in nominal value or EUR 563.5 million in discounted value. The discount rate is 7.46%, which corresponds to the base rate for Hungary plus 100 basis points. What at first sight may be puzzling here is that discounting normally results in an amount that is smaller than the nominal amount. Yet, in this case the discounted value is larger. This is because costs incurred after the application for aid but before the date of formal approval were brought forward to the later date. The investment costs concern building construction, machinery, equipment, and IT physical infrastructure. They do not include lease costs, intangible assets or wage costs. 

Form and amount of aid

 The aid is in the form of a grant and will be administered by the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency [HIPA]. 

 The amount of aid is EUR 71.6 million in nominal value or EUR 69.2 million in discounted value. 

 As required by RAG, state aid for LIPs must be adjusted downwards according to the formula: 

Adjusted aid amount = R × (A + 0.50 × B + 0.34 × C) 

In the present case, the adjusted maximum aid amount is calculated as follows: 

Maximum aid = 0.3 x (EUR 50m + 0.5xEUR 50m + 0.34xEUR 463.5m) = EUR 69.8 million 

It follows that the amount of aid that will be granted [i.e. EUR 69.2 million] does not exceed the maximum permissible amount [i.e. EUR 69.8 million]. Expressed differently, the maximum permissible aid intensity is 12.38% (= 69.8/563.5). However, Hankook will receive aid at the slightly lower rate of intensity of 12.28% (= 69.2/563.5). 

 As mentioned earlier, the project is expected to generate 469 direct jobs. This means that the aid of EUR 69.2 million corresponds to about EUR 148,000 per job created. 

Incentive effect

In its assessment of regional investment aid, the Commission always makes a distinction between the formal and the substantive incentive effect. The formal incentive effect requires that the application for the aid precedes the start of works. This was the case here. 

A substantive incentive effect exists only when the aid induces the recipient to carry out a project it would not otherwise carry out without the aid [“scenario 1” or investment decision] or to locate it in an assisted area [“scenario 2” or location decision]. In scenario 1, the net present value [NPV] without aid must be negative. In scenario 2, the NPV without aid must be negative or lower than the NPV at the best alternative location [the NPV has to be positive at the alternative location]. In this case, the substantive incentive effect was demonstrated on the basis of scenario 2. 

After examining the decision-making process of Hankook to confirm that indeed a credible alternative location had been considered, the Commission considered the NPV calculations with and without aid in Hungary and at the alternative location that was outside the EEA. The NPV calculations, using Hankook’s WACC as the discount factor, were as follows: 

NPV at alternative location [non-EEA]: [EUR 150-200] million 

NPV in Hungary without aid: [EUR 50-70] million 

NPV in Hungary with aid: [EUR 110-130] million 

NPV gap without aid: [EUR 100-120] million 

NPV gap with aid: [EUR 40-60] million 

Four things need to be noted at this point. First, the NPV at the alternative location always takes into account any subsidies that may be offered by the public authorities there. Second, the NPV in Hungary without aid was positive. That is, Hankook’s investment would be profitable also without the aid. Third, the aid raised the profitability of the investment in Hungary so as to induce it to produce in Hungary. Fourth, even with the aid, the investment in Hungary was less profitable than at the alternative location. 

The NPV gap between the two locations was not eliminated by the aid. This immediately raises the question why Hankook decided to invest in Hungary despite the lower profitability of the project. According to the Commission decision, the Hungarian location offered “(53) other benefits, …, which are mainly the ability to pursue Hankook Global’s […] strategy. The […] strategy that could be implemented in Hungary would make it easier to organise transport, since the [heavy vehicle] tyres that will be produced in the factory in Hungary will be sold on the European market. Further, for Hankook Global the […] strategy would minimise risk in cases of war or economic instability […].” So, Hankook valued the ease of distribution in Europe and the lower risk of disruption of production in Hungary at about EUR 40-60 million over the life of the project. 

Compatibility assessment

The aid is to be granted in the context of a GBER-based measure. However, it had to be individually notified to the Commission because the GBER does not cover aid amounts that exceed EUR 24.75 million per undertaking per investment project in “a” areas with maximum aid intensity of 30%. The amount of EUR 24.75 is derived by applying the formula for the downward adjustment of aid for investment with eligible costs of EUR 110 million or more. In this case the proposed aid of EUR 69.2 million far exceeded the threshold of EUR 24.75 million. 

As is the Commission’s standard practice with respect to regional aid, it first assessed the contribution of the aid to regional development and found that the creation of 469 direct jobs, the creation of indirect jobs, the prospective improvement of labour skills and the positive effects of the project on the local and regional economy would stimulate regional development. 

Moreover, given the handicaps holding back underdeveloped areas, the Commission also found that state intervention was necessary. In addition, state aid, instead of other policy instruments, was also appropriate because according to the Commission “(121) infrastructural developments and other general measures such as enhancing the quality of education and training, or improving the business environment, typically have a longer-term impact and are not sufficient to incite investment decisions in the short term and therefore are not sufficient to reduce the given regional disparities. In this kind of economic situation, State aid has already been acknowledged by the Commission’s case practice as an appropriate means to address the economic shortcomings. In the absence of elements pointing to the contrary, the Commission considers it appropriate to follow the same approach in the present case.” In other words, state aid is like caffeine providing an immediate boost to the system. 

The form of the aid – i.e. a grant – was also an appropriate means of intervention. “(124) The Commission considers that, …, a direct grant constitutes an appropriate aid instrument to bridge the identified viability gap by reducing the necessary investment costs so as to reduce the NPV gap between the alternative investment locations, and thereby offer the necessary incentive to attract the investment to the ‘a’ area concerned. Other potentially less distortive forms of aid are unlikely to be capable of making an equally effective contribution to the notified measure’s objectives. This is because such measures are unlikely to provide sufficient cash resources to attract the necessary investment from potential beneficiaries and incentivise them to carry out their investment.” 

I suppose the reference to “cash resources” actually means cost-free resources [e.g. no loans that incur interest until they are repaid]. But the statement in the above paragraph is puzzling because what matters to a company is the gross grant equivalent [GGE] amount of the aid. Afterall, all aid measures must be expressed in their GGE. 

With respect to the incentive effect and the proportionality of the aid, the Commission took into account the remaining NPV gap [i.e. after the aid] between the Hungarian and the alternative location outside the EEA and, because the counterfactual scenario was credible and its information and assumptions were contemporary and genuine, it concluded that the aid had an incentive effect and was proportional. 

With respect to possible negative effects, the Commission found no manifest negative effect on competition, as the project would not create overcapacity in the market for large tyres, which was not in absolute decline. 

With respect to any adverse effects on cohesion, the Commission found no “manifest negative effect” on trade. First, the aid did not have a counter-cohesion effect; the alternative location was not a less prosperous area in the EEA. Second, the aid did not encourage relocation with loss of jobs in another EEA region; Hankook did not and would not close down a similar facility in the EEA. 

Therefore, the Commission approved the notified measure. 

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About

Phedon Nicolaides

Dr. Nicolaides was educated in the United States, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. He has a PhD in Economics and a PhD in Law. He is professor at the University of Maastricht and the University of Nicosia. He has published extensively on European integration, competition policy and State aid. He is also on the editorial boards of several journals. Dr. Nicolaides has organised seminars and workshops in many different Member States, and has acted as consultant to several public authorities.

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