Table of Contents:
- Introduction
- The loans and the CAT challenge
- The issues before the Court of Appeal
- The Supreme Court appeal
- The significance of the case for public authorities and challengers
- Conclusion: A Substance-Over-Form Subsidy Control Regime. For now?
Introduction
On 30 October 2026, the Supreme Court granted Aubrey Weis permission to appeal, in part, against the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Weis v Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) [2026] EWCA Civ 825. Permission was granted on two grounds concerning the nature and scope of the jurisdiction of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) under the Subsidy Control Act 2022 (SCA 2022), while permission was refused on a third ground. The appeal will consider whether, in determining whether financial assistance constitutes a subsidy, the CAT should decide for itself whether the commercial market operator (CMO) principle is satisfied or instead review the public authority’s decision on general public law grounds. It will also consider whether the CAT’s jurisdiction is confined to determining compliance with the CMO principle or extends to free-standing grounds of public law review.
Subject to the outcome of that appeal, the Court of Appeal’s judgment remains the first appellate consideration of the SCA 2022 and provides important guidance on the relationship between process, substance and judicial review under the new regime. Its central message is that, in a case concerning the application of the CMO principle, the focus is on whether the measure confers an economic advantage, rather than whether the public authority has perfectly documented its decision-making process. The Supreme Court appeal may, however, affect the basis on which the CAT is entitled to reach that substantive conclusion.
The loans and the CAT challenge
The case concerned a challenge brought by Mr Weis, a Manchester property developer, before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) (Mr Aubrey Weis v GMCA [2025] CAT 41), that loans totalling £120 million made from the Greater Manchester Housing Investment Loan Fund and administered by the GMCA to special purpose vehicles set up by a competing developer were unlawful subsidies. The GMCA argued that the loans were not subsidies because they were granted on arm’s length terms, at commercial rates. Thus, the GMCA argued that the CMO principle set out in section 3(2) of the SCA 2022 applied. This section states that “[F]inancial assistance is not to be treated as conferring an economic advantage on an enterprise unless the benefit to the enterprise is provided on terms that are more favourable to the enterprise than the terms that might reasonably have been expected to have been available on the market to the enterprise”.
The statutory guidance issued by the Secretary of State under the SCA 2022 to which public authorities must have regard sets out various tests for public authorities to use in considering whether funding amounts to a subsidy. It was common ground that the GMCA did not formally apply any of these. The CAT drew heavily on EU state aid jurisprudence concerning the Market Economy Operator Principle (MEOP). It held that public authorities are entitled to a margin of appreciation when making commercial assessments because market operators themselves may legitimately reach different conclusions about risk and return. Accordingly, the CAT did not ask whether it would itself have made the loans. Instead, it asked whether the GMCA’s conclusion that a commercial lender could have made the loans was outside the range of rational commercial judgments. The CAT found that the loans were made following a “perfectly rational” process and on terms which could not “be fairly categorised as low or obviously below market or commercial rates”. As a result, the CMO principle applied and no subsidy was given by the GMCA.
The issues before the Court of Appeal
An appeal to the Court of Appeal must be made on points of law. Mr Weis’ challenge raised three legal questions of principle under SCA 2022. First, what is the role of the CAT? Was the CAT confined to reviewing the public authority’s reasoning or was it entitled to determine for itself whether the transaction satisfied the CMO test? Second, how important is process? Can a commercial transaction be successfully challenged under SCA 2022 because the public authority failed adequately to document its analysis or otherwise made errors in its decision making? Third, on the use of evidence. To what extent can the CAT consider evidence beyond what was before the authority at the date of the decision?
The Supreme Court has subsequently granted Mr Weis permission to appeal on the first two of three grounds advanced by him. Those grounds, and their potential significance for the Court of Appeal’s analysis, are considered below. Permission was refused on ground 3.
On the role of the CAT, the Court of Appeal’s answer was nuanced, producing what might be described as a hybrid jurisdiction. Although section 70(5) requires the CAT to apply judicial review principles, in determining whether financial assistance constitutes a subsidy the CAT is not confined to reviewing the adequacy of the public authority’s reasoning. The question under section 3(2) is whether, objectively, the transaction conferred an economic advantage by providing terms more favourable than those available on the market. On the Court of Appeal’s analysis, the CAT is entitled to determine whether the CMO principle is satisfied, but it must do so through the lens of judicial review, as required by section 70(5). The CAT therefore does not substitute its own commercial judgment for that of the authority; rather, it assesses whether the authority could rationally conclude on the evidence that a commercial market operator would have entered into the transaction on those terms. The focus is ultimately on the substantive question of market comparability and commerciality, not merely on the adequacy of the authority’s reasoning process or documentation. In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeal also emphasised the specialist nature of the CAT, including the expertise of its tribunal members.
On the role of process deficiencies, the Court of Appeal held that such deficiencies do not, in themselves, establish the existence of a subsidy or prevent reliance on the CMO principle. A public authority does not lose the benefit of the CMO principle merely because it failed to document its reasoning fully, did not expressly apply every aspect of the statutory guidance, or produced an imperfect decision record. While procedural shortcomings may be relevant evidence and may make it more difficult for an authority to demonstrate that a transaction was commercial, the question remains a substantive one: whether the transaction was, in reality, one that a rational commercial operator could have entered into on the relevant terms. Consistent with both the CAT’s judgment in Weis itself and New Lottery, the Court emphasised that subsidy control challenges should focus on material defects in the underlying commercial analysis rather than technical criticisms of process. Put simply, process may provide evidence relevant to the substantive question, but it is not the statutory test.
On the question of evidence, the Court of Appeal held that the CAT is not confined to the evidence that was before the public authority when the decision was taken and may consider additional evidence when assessing whether the CMO principle is objectively satisfied. However, the relevant question must still be assessed as at the date of the challenged decision: subsequent evidence is admissible only insofar as it helps the CAT determine whether the authority’s conclusion about market terms was correct at that time. It cannot be used to justify a transaction by reference to later events or changes in market conditions.
The Supreme Court appeal
The Supreme Court has granted permission to appeal on grounds 1 and 2, while refusing permission on ground 3. Ground 1 concerns how the CAT must decide whether financial assistance constitutes a subsidy: whether it must determine for itself, as an objective matter, whether the CMO principle in section 3(2) is satisfied, or instead review the public authority’s assessment on general public law grounds. The distinction is important because the former approach potentially permits a more intensive inquiry, including consideration of evidence that was not before the authority, while the latter would place greater emphasis on the legality of the authority’s own decision, its reasons and the evidence available to it at the time.
Ground 2 concerns the scope of the CAT’s jurisdiction: whether it is limited to determining whether the statutory conditions for a subsidy, including the CMO principle, are satisfied, or whether it can also consider free-standing public law challenges to the authority’s decision-making. This is particularly important where the CAT concludes that the financial assistance was not a subsidy but the challenger nevertheless alleges defects in the authority’s process.
Permission was refused on ground 3. The Supreme Court’s published permission decision does not set out the formulation of that ground, recording only that it did not raise an arguable point of law of general public importance.
Grounds 1 and 2 go beyond the particular loans at issue. Together, they concern the boundary between the CAT’s express obligation to apply judicial review principles under section 70(5) and the logically prior question of whether the measure under challenge is a subsidy at all. The Supreme Court’s decision may therefore determine the intensity of the CAT’s review, the evidence it may consider and the forum in which free-standing public law challenges connected with alleged subsidies should be brought.
The significance of the case for public authorities and challengers
For public authorities, the practical lesson is to take the CMO assessment seriously and document it contemporaneously. The Court of Appeal’s judgment indicates that an imperfect decision-making process will not, without more, turn an objectively commercial transaction into a subsidy. Nevertheless, robust contemporaneous evidence of the commercial assumptions, market comparators, risk analysis and expected return will both reduce litigation risk and make the substantive CMO case easier to establish. Pending the Supreme Court appeal, authorities should not assume that deficiencies in their contemporaneous assessment can necessarily be cured by evidence produced during litigation.
For challengers, the Court of Appeal’s judgment raises the evidential bar. On its approach, it will generally be insufficient to identify gaps in the authority’s documentation, departures from statutory guidance or other defects in process. Instead, a challenger will need to demonstrate that the transaction falls outside the range of terms that a rational commercial operator might reasonably have accepted. Economic evidence, including valuation evidence, market data and commercial comparators, may therefore be critical. The CAT gave Mr Weis permission to adduce expert evidence on the CMO test, although he ultimately did not do sodue to the cost of doing so. Such evidence would have needed to demonstrate that the terms of the loans fell outside those that a commercial market operator might reasonably have offered. The Supreme Court appeal introduces an important possible qualification: if the CAT’s role is properly one of general public law review, challengers may be able to place greater reliance on defects in the authority’s own assessment, while ground 2 may also determine whether those complaints can be pursued before the CAT or must instead be brought in the Administrative Court.
Conclusion: A Substance-Over-Form Subsidy Control Regime. For now?
The Court of Appeal’s judgment points towards a substance-over-form approach to subsidy control. In applying the CMO principle, its focus is on whether public financial assistance confers an economic advantage, rather than whether the public authority’s decision-making process was perfectly documented. On that approach, CMO challenges are likely to turn principally on the commercial merits of the transaction and the supporting economic evidence rather than deficiencies in administrative process.
That analysis is not, however, necessarily the final word. The Supreme Court’s consideration of grounds 1 and 2 will determine important questions about the respective roles of the CAT and the public authority, including how the CAT’s assessment of whether a subsidy exists fits with Parliament’s express requirement in section 70(5) that it apply judicial review principles. The judgment is therefore likely to be significant not merely for the CMO principle, but for the nature and scope of subsidy control litigation more generally.