The Draft New GBER

Draft GBER
  • Ex post evaluation of large aid schemes is no longer required.
  • “Small amounts” of aid at a higher rate of aid intensity are allowed up to certain amounts.
  • Certain start-ups are eligible for aid even if, technically, they qualify as undertakings in difficulty.
  • A new category of “applied research” is introduced.
  • Member States are permitted to choose the method by which to determine the amount of environmental aid.
  • Excess aid from infrastructure projects does not have to be clawed back after 10 years.
  • State aid may now be granted to “social enterprises” and for “affordable housing.

 

Table of Contents:

  1.  Introduction
  2.  Simplification
  3.  Adapting the GBER in line with social, market and technological developments
  4. Streamlining the GBER
  5. A summary of the main features of the common provisions

 

Introduction

The European Commission has recently published the draft text of a new General Block Exemption Regulation that will replace the current Regulation 651/2014 which expires at the end of December of this year. [1]
The Explanatory Memorandum [2] that accompanies the draft GBER explains that the revision “is aimed at:

  1. simplifying the GBER;
  2. bringing it into line with social, market and technological developments; and
  3. streamlining it by addressing inconsistencies and improving readability.”

Before examining how the draft GBER seeks to achieve those three objectives, it is worth noting that its structure remains largely the same as that of the current GBER. Both have four chapters, with chapters I, II and IV containing common provisions, while chapter III, which is the longest in both Regulations, contains the specific provisions on the various categories of aid.
However, there are major differences between the current and the draft Regulation, especially in how the current and new categories of aid are allocated to different sections and articles. Another notable difference between the two Regulations is that the long Article 2 which in the current Regulation lays down the various notification thresholds has been abolished. Instead, each provision on a specific aid category in chapter III of the draft Regulation defines the relevant notification threshold.

Simplification

According to the Explanatory Memorandum, “the common provisions on the transparent calculation of aid amounts, the incentive effect, the concept of ‘start of works’ and the cumulation of aid from various sources will be simplified to make them easier to interpret and apply.”
There is no longer a requirement for ex post evaluation of large aid schemes on the basis of notified and approved evaluation plans.
A major innovation of the draft GBER is the more favourable treatment of “small amounts” of aid. That is, certain types of aid such as aid for SMEs or for R&D are allowed at a higher rate of aid intensity, provided that absolute amount of aid does not exceed certain thresholds.
Because start-ups “eat” through their capital as they develop their products, they often fall within the definition of undertaking in difficulty. As such, they are excluded from most aid that can be provided on the basis of the current GBER. The draft GBER allows aid for certain start-ups under the R&D provisions. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that on 24 March 2026, the Commission also published Recommendation 2026/720 on the definition of innovative enterprises, innovative startups and innovative scaleups. [3]
Another new aspect of the draft GBER is that it lays down general conditions on aid compatibility for financial intermediaries to facilitate the granting of aid in the form of financial instruments.
Certain activities that fall within the scope of primary agricultural production sector or fisheries and aquaculture will in the future be eligible for support under the draft GBER.
The provisions on aid for RDI are also simplified. The new category of “applied research” is introduced as an alternative to the current three categories of research projects. It should be noted that this category already exists in the current RDI Framework. It combines industrial research and experimental development. It will not be necessary for Member States to distinguish between industrial research and experimental development projects.
Moreover, the provisions on research infrastructure and testing and experimentation infrastructure are merged.
There is also simplification with respect to environmental aid. Member States will be able to choose between determining the aid amount through a competitive process or on the basis of aid intensities. In some cases, the funding gap method is also be an option. Aid intensities can be applied to the total eligible investment costs, rather than the additional investment necessary to achieve the higher environmental protection. Many aspects of the provisions on environmental aid and energy efficiency are amended or simplified.
With respect to public support of infrastructure, the draft GBER allows the aid amount to be calculated on the basis of a simplified funding-gap method in certain cases. It also allows the use of aid intensity rates where it is not currently such as for local infrastructure.
A major innovation with respect to infrastructure is a new general rule according to which Member States will have to claw-back excess aid only for a period of 10 years instead for the overall economic life of the project.

Adapting the GBER in line with social, market and technological developments

The draft GBER introduces the new concept of “social enterprise” which is an enterprise that has its primary objective to achieve a positive social impact, uses at least half of its profits to achieve its primary social objective, and the distribution of profits does not undermine its primary objective. They are eligible for state aid mostly under the provisions concerning investment aid to SMEs.
In addition, the draft GBER allows certain types of aid for small mid-caps to enable them to develop digital technologies.
Lastly, the draft GBER covers now explicitly both social housing and affordable housing. While public service obligations can be imposed on social housing providers by the recently adopted Commission Decision 2025/2630, Member States will be able to grant investment aid to support social and affordable housing without imposing such obligations.

Streamlining the GBER

Aid categories are regrouped into thematically coherent sections as, for example, certain types of infrastructure that are placed in a single section. The rules on research infrastructure and on testing and experimental infrastructure are merged into a single article.
Overall the language of the draft GBER is supposed to be simpler and easier to understand and apply.
Interestingly, a separate guidance document will also be issued by the Commission that, among other things, will spell out various categories of eligible investment costs and the different methods that can be used by Member States. The guidance document will also contain examples to illustrate important concepts. Lastly, it will also provide answers to frequently asked questions.
According to the Memorandum, the guidance document will be issued either at the point of the formal adoption of the new GBER or shortly afterwards. There is no indication whether it will be regularly updated. However, what all stakeholders need, not just Member States, is access to the explanations that the Commission provides in response to queries by Member States.

A summary of the main features of the common provisions

Article 1: Scope

Unlike the current Regulation, the draft Regulation does not list the categories of aid it covers. It immediately lists what is excluded.
Most notably, there is no requirement for ex post evaluation of measures with annual budgets exceeding EUR 150 million.
However, it contains the same exclusions, but in more detail, as the current GBER:

  • Export aid.
  • Aid contingent on the use of domestic products.
  • Aid for primary agricultural products.
  • Aid for fisheries and aquaculture [includes many qualifications].
  • Aid for closure of mines.
  • Aid to undertakings subject to an outstanding recovery order.
  • Aid to undertakings in difficulty [includes many exceptions as, for example, risk finance, start-ups, innovative enterprises].
  • Measures that entail non-severable violation of EU law.

Article 2: Definitions

It is difficult to compare the definitions in the current and the draft Regulation. There are also too many, close to 200.

Article 3: Conditions for exemption

The current version is short – one paragraph.
The draft version is longer and contains important clarifications as follows:

  • It specifies that the relevant date for assessing compliance with the Regulation is the date of granting the aid.
  • For infrastructure, compliance will be required only for up to 10 years from the granting of the last payment of aid.
  • Compliance is assessed at the level of the recipient undertaking.
  • Concessions or entrustment for construction, operation or renting of infrastructure must be assigned through a competitive and unconditional basis.
  • Aid granted in tranches must be discounted using the relevant discount rate [i.e. base rate plus 100 bps].

Article 4: Provisions on financial instruments

The current Article 4 on notification thresholds has been deleted. Notification thresholds are now incorporated in the corresponding articles in the specific provisions of the Regulation (see below Article 5). The main provisions on financial instruments are as follows:

  • Aid via financial intermediaries is exempted from notification, provided it complies with all common provisions and the relevant specific provisions. However, Article 4 excludes from its scope aid for access to finance for SMEs and financial products under InvestEU.
  • The aid must be provided in the form of a contribution to intermediaries and may include a grant component for the final beneficiaries.
  • Intermediaries must demonstrate that as much as possible benefits are passed on to final beneficiaries.
  • Intermediaries must be commercially-oriented and profit-driven and must be selected through an open and non-discriminatory procedure.
  • Guarantees may not exceed 80% of liabilities.
  • Losses must be sustained proportionally by the state and the intermediaries.
  • In case of asymmetric losses, Member States may assume first loss not exceeding 25% of the total investment.

Article 5: Notification thresholds

The current Article 5 on the transparency of aid has been moved to draft Article 6 and/or absorbed in other provisions. The new Article 5 explains that the thresholds are now incorporated in the relevant specific provisions.

Article 6: Determination of the aid amount

The current Article 6 on incentive effect has been moved to the draft Article 8 (see below).
It states how the gross-grant equivalent of state aid is to be calculated without resorting to “complex economic assessment”, much like the current Article 5 on transparency which, however, refers to “risk assessment” rather than “complex economic assessment”. The following are considered not to require complex economic assessment:

  • Grants, loans, guaranteed amounts, repayable advances.
  • Interest subsidies.
  • Loans whose GGE is calculated on the basis of the reference rate.
  • Guarantees whose GGE is calculated on the basis of the safe-harbour premium.
  • Sale or lease of tangible assets whose GGE is determined by reference to the market rate.
  • Capped tax advantages.

Article 7: Aid intensity and eligible costs

It retains much of the current Article 7. The requirement for discounting has been moved to the draft Article 3.

Article 8: Incentive effect

The rules on cumulation in the current Article 8 have been moved to the draft Article 9.
Aid must have an incentive effect. For aid to be considered to have an incentive effect, the application for the aid must be submitted before the start of the project.
Ad hoc aid to large enterprises must lead to an increase in the scope of the project or the amount of private money committed to the project or the speed of completion of the project.
Tax advantages are presumed to have an incentive effect when the right to the aid is established automatically and according to objective criteria.
A number of listed aid categories are deemed to have an incentive effect.

Article 9: Cumulation

It very much reflects the text of the current Article 8.
In general, direct EU funding can be ignored for the purpose of complying with the maximum aid intensities or notification thresholds.
Aid for identifiable eligible costs can be cumulated with other aid for the same costs, if the maximum intensity rate is not exceeded, or with aid for different identifiable costs or with aid for non-identifiable costs.
Aid for non-identifiable eligible costs in certain specified Articles may be cumulated with other state aid for identifiable costs or with aid for non-identifiable costs up to the highest total threshold.
State aid may be cumulated with de minimis aid for the same eligible costs if the relevant aid intensity threshold is not exceeded.

Article 10: Publication and information

Member States must publish summary information and the full text of each aid measure and each individual award exceeding EUR 100,000.
There are specific rules with respect to certain categories of aid.

Article 11: Withdrawal of the benefit of the GBER

If a Member State fails to apply the GBER correctly, the Commission may decide to withdraw the exemption from notification and, instead, require that Member State to notify its aid measures in accordance with Article 108(3) TFEU.

Article 12: Reporting

Member States must submit to the Commission a summary information sheet for every measure implemented on the basis of the GBER within 20 working days.
Member States must submit an annual report.

Article 13: Monitoring

Member States must maintain records for 10 years.
If the Commission requests information concerning the application of the GBER, Member States must provide the information within 20 working days.

 

[1] The text of the draft GBER can be accessed at:
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/13d86416-7f23-466e-83aa-0af8105b72d2_en?filename=empty_file_en.pdf

[2] It Memorandum can be accessed at:
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/75eccdf3-2811-4207-8577-12fdc06a0bd9_en?filename=2026_draft_GBER_explanatory_memorandum_en.pdf

[3] The Recommendation can be accessed at:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202600720

Tags

About

Phedon Nicolaides

Dr. Nicolaides was educated in the United States, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. He has a PhD in Economics and a PhD in Law. He is professor at the University of Maastricht and the University of Nicosia. He has published extensively on European integration, competition policy and State aid. He is also on the editorial boards of several journals. Dr. Nicolaides has organised seminars and workshops in many different Member States, and has acted as consultant to several public authorities.

Leave a Reply

Related Posts